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An Essay on Ending the
Exclusionary Rule
By GARY S. GOODPASTER*
The exclusionary rule is the most controversial rule in all of crimi-
nal law. The basic federal and state "remedy" for unlawful police ac-
tivity,1 it has been criticized sharply and vigorously as an ineffective
remedy,2 a hindrance to law enforcement efforts against crime,3 a bene-
fit to criminals but not to the innocent, 4 and a barrier to truth-finding in
criminal trials.5 It is an unsettled and unsettling rule struggling for
acceptance.
Public fear of crime is intense. While accurate crime rates are im-
possible to state,6 there is a strong public feeling that crime, particularly
violent crime, is out of control.7 The public has demanded and re-
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fenders of San Diego, Inc. B.A., 1961; J.D., 1965, Indiana University. I wish to thank my
research assistants, Michael N. Alexander, Holly Beckner, and Craig Dolge, for their excel-
lent aid in preparing and completing this Article.
1. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (state); Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165
(1952) (state); Weeks v. United States 232 U.S. 383 (1914) (federal).
2. S. SCHLESINGER, EXCLUSIONARY INJUSTICE 47, 50-60 (1977); see also Bivens v. Six
Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 416-18 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
3. See Wilkey, The Exclusionary Rule: hy Suppress ValidEvidence?, 62 JUDICATURE
215, 225-26 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Wilkey].
4. Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128, 136-37 (1954); Wilkey, supra note 3, at 227-28.
5. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 137 (1978); Wilkey, supra note 3, at 220-22.
6. See C. SILBERMAN, CRIMINAL VIOLENCE, CRIMINAL JUSTICE 450-55 (1978).
7. A Los Angeles Times telephone survey of 2,063 people living in metropolitan Los
Angeles between Jan. 18 and 22, 1981, revealed that fully half of those surveyed feared being
victims of violent crime. Endicott, Public Calls Crime L.A.'s Top Problem, L.A. Times, Feb.
1, 1981, pt. 1, at 1, col. 1. The figure in other major cities around the nation is 36%. Id The
Times reported that 48% of the people polled in Los Angeles and its suburbs said that crime
is the area's most serious problem. Id Nationally, 37% of the population shares that view.
Id A nationwide poll, conducted for Newsweek by the Gallup Organization, found that
58% of those questioned believed that there was more crime in their area than there had
been a year before, and 75% reported that they thought criminals were more violent than
they.had been five years before. NEWSWEEK, March 23, 1981, at 47. Newsweek reported
that people are not afraid so much of domestic or ghetto violence and organized crime as
they are of random and vicious assaults and robberies by complete strangers. Id at 48.
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ceived severe criminal laws and stiff, often mandatory, sentences.8 The
death penalty has widespread support.9 Enormous resources have been
given to law enforcement to prevent, fight, and detect crime.' 0 Official
8. The passage of Proposition 7, the 1978 California death penalty initiative, exempli-
fies this. See note 9 infra. Now codified, the initiative provided for a mandatory sentence of
death, or life without possibility of parole, for cases of first degree murder involving at least
one of 19 possible special circumstances. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 190-190.5 (West Supp.
1981). Additionally, §§ 1203.06-.09 of the California Penal Code, enacted in 1977, provide
for mandatory prison terms for a variety of offenses, including: use of a firearm during the
commission of a murder, robbery, burglary, kidnapping, rape, or assault with intent to mur-
der or rape; certain sex offenses; certain narcotics violations; infliction of great bodily injury
during the commission of a murder, rape, kidnapping, burglary, or assault with the intent to
commit the same; certain designated felonies if the defendant has had prior felony convic-
tions within 10 years; violent felonies committed while on parole; and certain crimes if com-
mitted against old, blind, or disabled people. Id §§ 1203.06-.09. In 1978, the California
legislature amended a variety of sections of the Penal Code relating to imprisonment. See
Act of September 5, 1978, ch. 579, 1978 Cal. Stat. 1980. Following the amendment's Janu-
ary 1, 1979 effective date, the mean determinate sentence increased for selected offenses as
follows: first degree robbery sentences increased from 43.16 months to 51.76 months; volun-
tary manslaughter from 51.12 to 62.21; rape from 75.43 to 98.94; oral copulation from 62.00
to 109.33. The mean sentence for robbery dropped from 56.85 to 55.70. See 11-12 JUDICIAL
COUNCIL OF CALIFORNIA SENTENCING PRACTICES QUARTERLY 6 (June 30, 1980). Another
example of public demand for mandatory sentences is the "use a gun, go to prison" law,
which California has maintained in amended form. California statutes provide for an addi-
tional consecutive term of one year for being armed during the commission or attempted
commission of a felony, and an additional two years for using a gun. CAL. PENAL CODE
§§ 12022, 12022.5 (West Supp. 1981). See People v. Tanner, 24 Cal. 3d 514, 596 P.2d 328,
156 Cal. Rptr. 450 (1979). According to a 1981 Newsweek poll, the public would support
much stiffer penalties for using a gun. Fifty-one percent of those polled thought use of a gun
should result in an additional 5 to 10 years' sentence; 15% felt the punishment should be life
imprisonment. NEWSWEEK, March 23, 1981, at 52.
9. Nationally, 65% of the people favor the death penalty for persons convicted of mur-
der; 24% are opposed. NEWSWEEK, March 23, 1981, at 52.
Support for the death penalty is equally overwhelming in California. In the November
1972 general elections, 5,447,165 people voted in favor of amending the California Constitu-
tion to provide for a death penalty, CAL. CONST. art. I, § 27; 2,617,541 voted against it.
Statement of Vote, compiled by Edmund G. Brown, Secretary of State, at 30 (November 7,
1972). This support was reaffirmed in the November 1978 general election, when 4,480,275
voted in favor of imposing death or life without possibility of parole for murders committed
in one or more of 19 special circumstances, see CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 190-190.5 (West Supp.
1981); 1,818,357 were opposed. Statement of Vote, compiled by March Fong Eu, Secretary
of State, at 39 (November 7, 1978).
10. The Law Enforcement Assistance Administration budget for fiscal year 1979 was
$646.5 million. LEAA funding represents less than 4% of the total annual state and local
criminal justice expenditures by the federal government. LAW ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE
ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, LEAA 11TH ANNUAL REPORT 4 (1919). In 1971,
the total expenditures for all federal, state, and local government criminal justice activities
was $10.5 billion. By 1978, that figure had jumped to $24.1 billion, an increase of 129%. Of
those sums, over $6 billion went to police protection in 1971. By 1978, the cost of police
protection had risen to $13 billion, a 112.5% increase. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 4 (1980). The total expenditures for crimi-
nal justice activities of state governments went from $2.9 billion in 1971 to $7.5 billion in
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and unofficial state and local citizen crime prevention commissions and
groups have been formed."' Massive research studies on crime and vi-
olence have been initiated,' 2 and high-level governmental task forces
have again studied crime and made recommendations.- 3 Yet the peo-
ple double-lock their doors and arm themselves.
In this atmosphere of public fear, desperation, and anger, the ex-
clusionary rule appears a sinister ally of criminal forces. Abolishing
the exclusionary rule is one control not yet tried, and the rule has now
become a major target of the crime control impulse.' 4 Important offi-
cials in the Department of Justice and on presidential advisory commit-
tees "have been dedicated for years to changing the rules of the
criminal justice system so as to make the prosecutor's work easier."' 5
The only debate is now "between total abolition and mere alteration of
the rule."16
Congress is considering changes to the exclusionary rule.' 7 Colo-
rado has adopted a good faith exception.' 8 In California, powerful
political forces back serious proposals to curtail, change, or revoke the
exclusionary rule. Proposed amendments to the California state consti-
tution would prevent using the independent state grounds doctrine, 19
create a state law enforcement commission and remove courts from ex-
1978, an increase of 158.3%. Of this, state expenditures for police protection went from just
under $1 billion to over $2 billion, showing an increase of 116.3%. Id at 28. The funding
for federal law enforcement activities in 1979 was $1.9 billion; the estimate for 1982 is $2.3
billion. Id at 42.
11. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 13810-13813, 13820-13824, 13830-13835.8, 13840-
13846, 13900-13906, 14100-14102 (West Supp. 1981).
12. See C. SILBERMAN, CRIMINAL VIOLENCE, CRIMINAL JUSTICE iX-XVi (1978).
13. See ATTORNEY GENERAL'S TASK FORCE ON VIOLENT CRIME, U.S. DEP'T OF JUS-
TICE, FINAL REPORT (1981).
14. See, e.g.,Exclusion Rule High on Reagan's Hit List!, Nat'l L.J., Aug. 10, 1981, at 21.
15. Remarks of Donald Santarelli to the 1981 Annual Convention of the Association of
Trial Lawyers of America, 29 CRIM. L. REP. (BNA) 2418 (Aug. 12, 1981).
16. Id
17. See S. 101, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REC. S154 (daily ed. Jan. 15, 1981)
(prohibiting suppression when fourth amendment violation was nonintentional or insub-
stantial); S. 751, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REC. S2401-02 (daily ed. March 19, 1981)
(abolishing the exclusionary rule).
18. COLO. REv. STAT. § 16-3-108 (Supp. 1981). The Montana legislature passed a bill
that would have abolished the exclusionary rule, but the governor vetoed the bill. See Nat'l
L.J., June 8, 1981, at 1, col. 3.
19. Cal. Senate Constitutional Amendment No. 7 (as amended) (introduced by Senator
Presley, Dec. 3, 1980) (emphasis added): "Notwithstanding any other provision of this Con-
stitution evidence shall not be excluded or limited for any purpose in any criminal, juvenile
justice, post-conviction and post-commitment proceeding except as provided by statute or as
required by the United States Constitution."
May 1982]
clusionary rule review, 20 or simply disallow use of the rule to remedy
Miranda2' and fourth amendment violations.2 2 Plainly, momentum to
end the regime of exclusion is growing; the rule may soon be altered or
abolished.
Given these efforts, it is important to reconsider the rule, its values,
functions, and effects, and to evaluate proposed changes and alterna-
tives to it. This Article reassesses the exclusionary rule and examines
two alternatives that arguably serve its constitutional functions: the
creation of a "good faith" exception to the rule and the establishment
of administrative agency control of the police.
23
To examine and assess these proposals as constitutional alterna-
tives to the exclusionary rule, a proper basis of comparison is necessary.
This Article first examines the constitutional functions now served by
the exclusionary rule and develops a constitutional measure that pro-
posed alternatives must meet. Alternatives to the exclusionary rule also
must satisfy sound criticisms of the rule. The Article therefore reviews
20. Cal. Assembly Constitutional Amendment 31 (introduced by Assemblyman Gog-
gin, March 5, 1981): "(a) The Commission on Law Enforcement shall consist of five mem-
bers. The Governor shall appoint the chair of the Commission. The Attorney General, the
Speaker of the Assembly, the Senate Rules Committee, and the governing body of the State
Bar shall each make one appointment. All terms are for 10 years.
"A vacancy shall be filled by the appointing power for the remainder of the term.
"(b) The remedy of exclusion of otherwise admissible evidence based upon a violation
of rights guaranteed by this Constitution or the United States Constitution shall not be em-
ployed in any legal proceeding if the evidence has been obtained by a police agency which is
certified by the commission pursuant to this section.
"(c) In order to improve the administration of justice, the commission shall promulgate
standards for certification of police agencies which have established policies and programs
that are sufficient to protect the rights guaranteed by this Constitution and the United States
Constitution and to deter and control unlawful police conduct.
"The commission shall establish a process by which police agencies may seek certifica-
tion under such terms and conditions as the commission deems necessary.
"The commission shall also provide for periodic review of certification and may revoke
such certification as it deems appropriate."
21. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
22. See California Proposition 8, § 3 (to be submitted to the voters June 8, 1982) (the
"Gann Initiative") which provides in relevant part: "Except as provided by statute hereafter
enacted by a two-thirds vote of the membership in each house of the Legislature, relevant
evidence shall not be excluded in any criminal proceeding, including pretrial and postcon-
viction motions and hearings, or in any trial or hearing of a juvenile for a criminal offense
23. There are many proposed alternatives to the exclusionary rule, e.g., a tort remedy,
citizen review boards, ombudsmen, a serious case exception, and a substantial violation
standard. See notes 152-53 infra. These and others like them are constitutionally inade-
quate substitutes for the exclusionary rule and are not discussed in this Article. Instead, the
Article focuses on the two alternatives that are both strongly advanced and arguably
constitutional.
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and critiques ten major criticisms of the exclusionary rule. Against the
comparisons of constitutional function and critical merit, the Article
examines the good faith exception and administrative agency certifica-
tion of police agencies as alternatives to the rule.
Constitutional Functions of the Exclusionary System
The Supreme Court has stated that fourth amendment rights are
personal rights,24 but that these rights are detached from a personal
constitutional remedy. In United States v. Calandra,25 Justice Powell,
writing for the Court, stated:
The purpose of the exclusionary rule is not to redress the injury to
the privacy of the search victim .... Instead, the rule's prime pur-
pose is to deter future unlawful police conduct and thereby effectuate
the guarantee of the Fourth Amendment against unreasonable
searches and seizures .... In sum, the rule is a judicially created
remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally
through its deterrent effect, rather than a personal constitutional right
of the party aggrieved.
26
An accused person therefore has no right to the exclusion of un-
lawfully seized evidence. The fourth amendment, which is a general
injunction of government, provides no sanction for its violation.
The concept of a personal constitutional right without a personal
constitutional remedy seems contradictory.27 Rights generally are mea-
sured by the remedies available for their injury or deprivation, and are
usually thought of as a personal possession or as a protected sphere of
action. Emphasizing the direct individual benefit accorded by rights,
however, ignores every legal right's necessary implication of the regula-
tion of the conduct of others. If one person has a right to do or have
something, others are proscribed from interfering and are sanctioned if
they do. All rights both confer benefits and regulate conduct.
Constitutional rights have the special feature of conferring benefits
on individuals both as personal and social goods. By exercising judi-
cially enforced constitutional rights, individuals ensure that the overall
intended constitutional structure of government survives. For example,
24. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 133-34 (1978); Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S.
165, 174 (1969); Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483, 489 (1964).
25. 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
26. Id at 347-48.
27. One might suspect that this formula was devised by the courts to limit the applica-
tion of the exclusionary rule. It certainly has that effect. See Burkoff, The Court That De-
voured the Fourth Amendment: The Triumph of an Inconsistent Exclusionary Doctrine, 58
OR. L. REV. 151 (1979); Schrock & Welsh, Up from Calandra: The Exclusionary Rule as a
Constitutional Requirement, 59 MINN. L. REv. 251 (1974).
May 1982] ENDING THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE
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if government cannot control the flow and spread of information be-
cause people have a right of free speech, it will have greater difficulty
manipulating people for its purposes. While free speech may be a good
of itself and of value to the speaker, its exercise by individuals also
affects the shape government can take. Constitutional rights, therefore,
are not only personal guarantees, but also instruments of constitutional
function; their exercise sets in motion a regulatory process that main-
tains a certain structure and kind of government.
2 8
Constitutional rights, in proscribing certain governmental actions,
are highly regulatory. It can therefore be legitimately argued, as it was
by Justice Powell in Calandra,2 9 that if the regulatory function of a
constitutional right is satisfied, it is of less concern that an infringement
of the personal benefit function of the right always and completely be
remedied.
This argument has a further consequence. The chief function of
the fourth amendment, as the Court in Calandra acknowledged, is reg-
ulatory; the fourth amendment restrains the police from abusing au-
thority and power. As long as the police are controlled under the
fourth amendment, how they are controlled does not matter.30 That is,
it is not constitutionally necessary to control the police solely through
remedying police violations of civil rights. As police control is the ma-
jor constitutional function of the exclusionary rule, however, the rule
should be replaced only if a means of police control as effective as or
better than the exclusionary rule is found.
This argument, although developed from fourth amendment case
law, may be generalized to any case in which exclusion of evidence is
used as a judicial means of enforcing the constitution and of controlling
official behavior. The argument thus applies to constitutional com-
mands under the fourth, fifth, sixth, and fourteenth amendments.
The many judicial pronouncements 3' and the numerous legal and
28. See Goodpaster, The Constitution and Fundamental Rights, 15 ARIZ. L. REV. 479,
510 (1973).
29. 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
30. Indeed, it can be argued that the exclusionary rule is not a good enough means to
exercise the requisite control over the police. See Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth
Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 433 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Perspectives]; Amster-
dam, The Supreme Court and the Rights of Suspects in Criminal Cases, 45 N.Y.U. L. REV.
785, 810-15 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Rights ofSuspects].
31. The Supreme Court has stated that the purposes of the rule are preservation of
judicial integrity, Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 484-85 (1976); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 12-
13 (1968); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 659 (1961); Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222
(1960), protection of privacy, Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. at 484-85; Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. at
655-56, and deterrence of police conduct violative of fourth amendment rights, Stone v.
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empirical studies32 discussing the purposes of the exclusionary rule as-
sume that the rule regulates through its punitive aspect. Without much
attention to how the rule operates in practice, courts uncritically have
repeated standard reasons for adopting the rule: to promote respect for
the judicial system and to preserve judicial integrity, to protect privacy,
and to deter unlawful police behavior.33 The Supreme Court, however,
no longer invokes judicial integrity or privacy as separate bases for the
rule; it emphasizes only the deterrent function.34 Debate about alterna-
tives to the rule thus focuses almost entirely on deterrence 35 and the
relative deterrent effectiveness of various sanctions.
Many assume that an alternative remedy or arrangement that is as
effective a deterrent as the exclusionary rule will be constitutionally ac-
ceptable. 36 The search for another device to control unlawful police
activity thus tends to focus only on the empirical issue of how proposed
alternative remedies, as compared to the exclusionary rule, discipline
the police. This formulation of the exclusionary rule's legal purposes
and functions, however, is misleading. It misapprehends and underval-
ues the rule's actual role in the criminal justice system.
Although the exclusionary rule is spoken of as though it were a
rule of law like any other, it is not merely a rule; it is an entire system of
exclusion serving many important, interrelated purposes, and deeply
institutionalized in many ways. The Supreme Court has asserted that
deterrence of police illegality is the basis for exclusion, but specific de-
terrence of future unlawful police conduct is only one of many impor-
tant regulatory functions served by the -exclusionary system. An
Powell, 428 U.S. at 485-86; United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 536-39 (1975); Michigan v.
Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 446-47 (1974); United States v. Calindra, 414 U.S. 338, 347 (1974);
Lee v. Florida, 392 U.S. 378, 386-87 (1968); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. at 12; Mapp v. Ohio, 367
U.S. at 656; Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. at 217.
32. See notes 44-45 infra.
33. See note 31 supra.
34. * "The Mapp majority justified the application of the rule to the States on several
grounds, but relied principally upon the belief that exclusion would deter future unlawful
police conduct. Although our decisions have often alluded to the 'imperative of judicial
integrity,' they demonstrate the limited role of this justification in the determination whether
to apply the rule in a particular context." Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. at 484-85 (footnotes
omitted); see also United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. at 536; United States v. Calandra, 414
U.S. at 347-48.
.35. See, e.g., Canon, The Exclusionary Rule: Have Critics Proven That It Doesn't Deter
Police?, 62 JUDICATURE 398 (1979); Schlesinger, The Exclusionary Rule: Have Proponents
Proven That It Is a Deterrent to Police?, 62 JUDICATURE 404 (1979) [hereinafter cited as
Schlesinger].
36. See, eg., Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 420-25 (1971) (Bur-
ger, C.J., dissenting).
May 1982]
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alternative that merely deters unlawful police behavior without satisfy-
ing these other functions cannot be equally effective. Therefore, the
true test of legal adequacy of replacements for the rule is whether the
alternative has regulatory effects upon the criminal justice system that
are equivalent to the actual historic and current functions and effects of
the rule.
37
What are the real regulatory functions the exclusionary rule effects
in a system of exclusion? The first implicit function of the rule is to
express the judiciary's constitutional regulatory power to review and
establish standards of lawful police behavior. As Chief Justice Warren
stated:
[I]n our system evidentiary rulings provide the context in which the
judicial process of inclusion and exclusion approves some conduct as
comportmg with constitutional guarantees and disapproves other ac-
tions by state agents. A ruling admitting evidence in a criminal trial
• . . has the necessary effect of legitimizing the conduct which pro-
duced the evidence, while an application of the exclusionary rule
withholds the constitutional imprimatur.
38
Thus, an acceptable alternative to the exclusionary rule must maintain
the regulatory role of the courts in interpreting and applying constitu-
tional mandates.
37. See Mertens & Wasserstrom, The Good Faith Exception to the Exclusionary Rule:
Deregulating the Police and Derailing the Law, 70 GEO. L.J. 365, 373-410 (1981). It is essen-
tial to distinguish between the articulation of the purposes or functions of a rule and the
actual purposes or functions served by the system of which the rule is an expression. In law,
regardless of the stated bases for the adoption of a rule, there may also be unstated reasons.
It is characteristic of common law development and legal reasoning that the result of a case
is controlling, not a particular statement of a rule or the statement of its rationale.- These are
recognized to be guides that are subject to reformulation as case law develops. After all,
rules are devised to deal with myriad fact situations, and often it is not clear in advance how
the formulation of a particular rule will operate in unknown situations. As case law devel-
ops, knowledge of how a particular formulation operates increases, and the actual purposes
of a rule become clearer. Readings and articulations of old rules and rationales are
amended continually as new cases arise. A particular statement of a rule or its rationale is
not binding if its phrasing is improved or the rule begins to serve new purposes.
38. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 13 (1968).
"It is... imperative to have a practical procedure by which courts can review alleged
violations of constitutional rights and articulate the meaning of those rights. The advantage
of the exclusionary rule-entirely apart from any direct deterrent effect-is that it provides
an occasion for judicial review, and it gives credibility to the constitutional guarantees."
Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U. CHI. L. REV. 665, 756
(1970) [hereinafter cited as Oaks]; accord 1 W. LAFAvE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 1.2(c)
(1978) [hereinafter cited as LAFAvE].
Justice Powell also acknowledged this regulatory function of the exclusionary rule. In
United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974), he noted that the exclusionary rule is a
judicially created remedy designed generally to safeguard fourth amendment rights through
deterrence. Id at 348; see also Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 486 (1976).
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Each major exclusionary rule case has involved a thorough, adver-
sarial examination of a particular police practice. The parties and the
courts have focused on the need for the practice and on the effect of
possible rulings on civil liberties and law enforcement. 39 In these cases,
courts have considered many of the nonpolitical factors contemplated
by legislatures in legislative hearings and administrative agencies in
rulemaking hearings.4° Obviously, an official code of legitimate police
behavior could be developed through legislative or administrative
hearings. Although invited to do this,4' legislatures have failed to re-
spond. This failure has created the second function of the rule.
The second important function of the rule is judicially to develop
and articulate partial codes of lawful police behavior and of civil liber-
ties. These codes, although incomplete, are detailed in a number of
areas. They define the legitimate investigative and regulatory activities
of law enforcement, and the values and interests protected by the due
process clauses and the fourth, fifth, and sixth amendments. They also
articulate general standards to protect those values and interests, and
set forth a number of specific rules applying those standards in particu-
lar fact situations.
These needed codes were developed through application of the ex-
clusionary system, and through the adversary trials of police practices
encouraged by it. This has become a primary practical function of the
exclusionary rule. Any effective alternative to the exclusionary rule
must fulfill this function.
The rule also has provided a great incentive for defense attorneys
to challenge police practices, because the rule may exclude from a
criminal trial evidence probative of guilt. Theoretically, the exclusion-
ary rule is one of the most useful tools of a defense attorney. Advocates
must assume that the client is innocent until proven guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt and may use every lawful means to advance a client's
interests and desires. If by challenging a particular police practice an
advocate succeeds in changing the quantity and quality of the govern-
ment's proof, the rule may induce a favorable plea bargain or make a
jury trial a defensible contest.
This effect of the exclusionary rule is not a direct social good. The
39. See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
40. E.g., Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260 (1973) (police functions); Terry v. Ohio,
392 U.S. 1 (1968) (same).
41. See, e.g., Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 500-01 (1976) (Burger, C.J., dissenting);
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 420-21 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissent-
ig); see also California v. Minares, 443 U.S. 916, 926-27 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting
from denial of application for stay).
May 1982]
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rule is undoubtedly of great utility to criminal lawyers, and for this
reason they support it strongly. Apart from arguments about over-
criminalization, overcharging by prosecutors, severity of sentences, su-
perior prosecutorial resources, and the pro-prosecution bias of most
citizens as justifications for this defense tool, the rule cannot be justified
because it helps attorneys defend their clients. As defense attorneys
have such strong professional incentives to attempt exclusion of evi-
dence, however, the rule has become a vehicle for close scrutiny of
myriad police practices.
The third function of the exclusionary rule and system thus has
been to provide incentives and a process for the critical examination of
police practices. As a result of the exclusionary rule, strong and aggres-
sive institutional forces are now an integral part of the exclusionary
system and create a vested interest in challenging police practices.
42 If
there were no exclusionary rule, this function of adversary examination
of police conduct and practices would not exist.
43
The fourth function of the exclusionary rule, a necessary product
of the other functions, is to educate. The Supreme Court's continued
examination of police conduct has been invaluable in improving police
forces and the criminal justice system. It has also promoted public
awareness of and sensitivity to police conduct and activities. Aware of
its rights and the proper limits of police action, the public is better able
to protect its civil liberties. Therefore, any effective alternative to the
exclusionary rule must ensure continued disclosure of, and public vigi-
lance regarding, police activities and rules for police conduct.
The fifth function of the exclusionary rule is to serve as a partial
remedy. The remedial function often is confused with the deterrent
function, but must be distinguished. Although remedies available for a
violation of rights can also deter violations before the fact, many legal
remedies do not deter. Nonetheless, a remedy is still required. For
example, damages may be awarded to a person injured by a defective
product although the award may not improve other products. Viola-
42. See Paulsen, The Exclusionary Rule and Misconduct by the Police, 52 J. CRIM. L.C.
& P.S. 255, 260 (1961).
43. Aside from the implicit functional necessity of adversary challenge, the Constitu-
tion requires an accusatorial rather than inquisitorial system of criminal justice, as the recent
right-to-counsel cases make clear. See United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264 (1980); Brewer
v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977). The right to counsel is a key constitutional right, protec-
tive of other important constitutional rights. Although part of an accused's personal right of
assistance, the right to counsel has also become a critical part of the exclusionary system and
makes it work. While a right to counsel would remain even without exclusion of evidence,
counsel play an essential role in constitutional rulemaking with regard to police conduct.
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tions of rights are remedied because these rights were violated. The
ideal remedy would also prevent injuries; but making whole, as well as
the law can, and deterring are quite different things.
As a remedy, the exclusionary rule awards a benefit to the injured
person; as a deterrent, the rule assertedly "punishes" the law enforce-
ment agency involved. This single device is invoked to achieve the
dual goals of remedy and deterrence. Thus, the exclusionary rule has
distinct deterrent and remedial functions. To be equally effective, an
alternative to the rule must serve both constitutional goals.
In attempting to return matters to the status quo ante, the rule ap-
proaches the ideal of remedies more closely than do other devices. Ap-
plication of the exclusionary rule requires that courts act as if the
evidence unlawfully obtained was not obtained at all. The situation
reverts to the evidentiary state that would have existed had there been
no police violation.
Although the exclusionary rule in this sense may approach the re-
medial ideal, it is not a useful remedy to everyone injured by police
misconduct. It provides relief only for a small, usually unsympathetic,
class of persons, the criminally accused, whose civil liberties have been
violated by the police. When a person treated unlawfully by the police
is not charged with a crime, there is no evidence to exclude. The exclu-
sionary rule's failure as a general remedy for all injured parties, how-
ever, does not mean it is no remedy at all. Certainly, it has been a real
remedy for persons who, because of it, did not go to trial, plea-bar-
gained, or were tried with amputated evidence.
The very fact that exclusion of evidence is useful as a remedy only
to the criminally accused, but not to innocent persons, means it is not
an adequate remedy. To the degree that remedies are also deterrents, it
also means that exclusion is not an adequate deterrent: police can vio-
late the rights of innocent persons with impunity.
Whether the exclusionary rule serves its explicit purpose, specific
deterrence of unlawful police conduct, remains an open question.
Some studies have found that police are deterred44 by the threat it
poses; but others conclude that they are not.45 It is rational, however, to
44. See Canon, The Exclusionary Rule: Have Critics Proven That It Doesn't Deter Po-
lice?, 62 JUDICATURE 398 (1979); Canon, Postscript on Empirical Studies and the Exclusion-
ary Rule, 62 JUDICATURE 455 (1979); Canon, Testing the Effectiveness of Civil Liberties
Policies at the State and Federal Levels: The Case of the Rule, 5 AM. POL. Q. 57 (1977).
45. S. SCHLESINGER, EXCLUSIONARY INJUSTICE (1977); Oaks, supra note 38; Schles-
inger, supra note 35; Spiotto, Search and Seizure: An Empirical Study of the Exclusionary
Rule and Its Alternatives, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 243, 276-77 (1973).
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assume that, although the rule has some deterrent effect, there are prob-
ably more effective deterrents.
The exclusionary rule has thus served at least six significant func-
tions in the criminal justice system: (1) asserting regulatory power over
the police, ultimately through judicial review; (2) rulemaking; (3) insti-
tutionally challenging police practices; (4) educating the public; (5) pro-
viding a remedy for police violations of civil liberties; and (6) deterring
unlawful police behavior. Of these six, the remedial and deterrent
functions have been the least well served.46 These functions and the
specific constitutional purposes of the several exclusionary rules form
the exclusionary system.
47
Constitutional Purposes Served by the Exclusionary System
Exclusion of evidence from criminal trials is the basic judicial tool
to remedy unlawful police conduct. Impermissible conduct, however,
may violate one or more constitutional rights, as when the police un-
lawfully seize evidence,48 take confessions improperly, 49 violate the
right to counsel,5 0 or engage in brutality and violence. 5  Although the
amendments to the United States Constitution have various purposes,
several contribute to a single constitutional function: the control of po-
lice forces. The reason for using the exclusionary remedy, however,
may differ for each amendment. For example, whereas the reason for
exclusion under the fourth amendment is to prevent unlawful police
searches and seizures,5 2 the reason for exclusion under the fifth amend-
ment privilege against self-incrimination is to preclude the use of invol-
untary confessions in trials.5 3 Underlying the prohibition of the use of
involuntary confessions are the questionable reliability of such confes-
46. See notes 86-95 & accompanying text infra.
47. Consider together the six real functions of the exclusionary rule articulated herein.
Do they really add up to anything more than the general idea of deterrence of unlawful
police behavior? In this sense, the rule's "only" function is as a deterrent. Once detailed,
however, deterrence appears to be a fundamentally important general rule, incorporating
several functions. This is often not what is understood by the idea of deterrence. Generally,
what seems to be intended is a much narrower concept, focused solely on discouraging of-
ficers from violating known laws.
48. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
49. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49 (1949);
Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143 (1944); Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
50. United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264 (1980); Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387
(1977); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964); Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201
(1964).
51. See Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
52. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655-60 (1961).
53. See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 643 (1961).
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sions,54 due process considerations of fairness, 55 and the privilege
against self-incrimination. 56 In sixth amendment cases, courts use the
rule to protect the right to counsel in criminal prosecutions.5 7 In due
process cases, courts use the rule to disapprove and dissociate the law
and the judiciary from police brutality or unnecessary force.
58
Although cases under these amendments illustrate the general use
of the exclusionary system to control police behavior, many critics of
the exclusionary rule focus on fourth amendment issues. 59 In discus-
sing alternatives to the rule, however, these commentators often fail to
note that the exclusionary remedy serves different specific legal pur-
poses and that restrictions on the rule may generate different constitu-
tional problems in different contexts. Proposed alternatives to
exclusion often do not provide equally acceptable solutions to the dis-
tinct problems that arise in applying the rule under the different
amendments. It would be better to distinguish a fourth amendment
exclusionary rule from a fifth amendment rule, a sixth amendment
rule, and a due process rule. Then it would be clear that the exclusion-
ary rule could be changed or abolished in one context while remaining
intact in another. For example, because the constitutional basis of the
rule may be stronger under the privilege against self-incrimination than
it is under the right to be free from unlawful search and seizure, the
remedy of exclusion constitutionally might be eliminated in fourth
amendment cases while remaining intact in fifth amendment cases.
60
This consideration should give pause to anyone who thinks that ending
or restricting the exclusionary rule is a simple matter or would be a
panacea for law enforcement.
Moreover, most commentators have neglected an important dis-
54. See Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 285-87 (1936); Y. KAMISAR, W. LAFAvE &
3. ISRAEL, MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 553-57 (1980).
55. See Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 320-21 (1959).
56. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).
57. See United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264, 269-75 (1980); Brewer v. Williams, 430
U.S. 387, 398-401 (1977); Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 205-06 (1964).
58. See Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 173-74 (1952).
59. See notes 44-45 supra.
60. The constitutional necessity of Miranda warnings is uncertain. They ultimately
may be treated in the same way the Court now treats fourth amendment rights. "The [Mi-
randa Court] recognized that these procedural safeguards [set out in Miranda] were not
themselves rights protected by the Constitution but were instead measures to insure that the
right against compulsory self-incrimination was protected." Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S.
433, 444 (1974). "Miranda's safeguards are premised on presumed unreliability long associ-
ated with confessions extorted by brutality or threats; they are not personal constitutional
rights, but are simply judicially created prophylactic measures." Brewer v. Williams, 430
U.S. 387, 423 (1977) (Burger, C.L, dissenting).
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tinction between fourth amendment exclusion and exclusion under the
fifth or sixth amendment. 61 By definition, fifth and sixth amendment
exclusions involve persons who are clear suspects, were arrested, or
otherwise have been subjected to criminal proceedings. The rules for
police behavior in these situations apply to the relatively small class of
those actually or virtually accused. In contrast, the fourth amendment
rules defining lawful police conduct protect all persons, whether or not
accused. Unlike fifth or sixth amendment exclusion, ending or signifi-
cantly weakening fourth amendment exclusion removes a major check
against unlawful searches or seizures of the apparently innocent. From
this perspective, proposals to end only fourth amendment exclusion
seem based not on dissatisfaction with exclusion, but on objections to
the substantive strictures of the fourth amendment.
62
Aside from these legal issues, public pressure to end the use of the
exclusionary rule tends to differ with the underlying facts of cases in
which evidence is excluded. For example, many fourth amendment ex-
clusion cases involve victimless crimes, such as narcotics, gambling,
and weapons offenses.63 Often, these cases are not controversial
enough to generate much publicity, so the general public is unlikely to
know if evidence is excluded.
Exclusion in some fifth and sixth amendment cases, however, may
generate public interest because a confession may be suppressed, or the
case may involve a violent crime, such as sexual assault or murder,
which often attracts great public attention. In these cases, generalized
fear of the crime and a wish that the offender be punished unite, form-
ing outrage against a ruling that statements of an admittedly dangerous
person cannot be used to convict him or her.64 Courts can be accused
not only of protecting the guilty, but of endangering the public by re-
leasing known, violent offenders. Disrespect, even contempt, for the
legal system may result.
65
This differential public response to the exclusion of evidence in
different kinds of cases is relevant to an assessment of alternatives to
61. Although all discussions of proposals do not distinguish between the different ex-
clusionary rules, some do limit discussion to fourth amendment applications. For a report
on congressional proposals to end the fourth amendment exclusion, see Congress Debates
Measures to Alter Exclusionary Rule, L.A. Daily J., Nov. 11, 1981, at 1, col. 6.
62. See text accompanying note 85 infra.
63. See N. MORRIS & G. HAWKINS, THE HONEST POLITICIAN'S GUIDE TO CRIME CON-
TROL 2-25 (1970); Kaplan, The Limits of the Exclusionary Rule, 26 STAN. L. REV. 1027, 1048-
49 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Kaplan].
64. See text accompanying notes 107-10 infra.
65. See text accompanying notes 111-14 infra.
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the exclusionary rule. It suggests that excluding incriminating state-
ments for violations of the privilege against self-incrimination or right
to counsel is more offensive to public values and sentiments than ex-
cluding evidence for an unlawful search and seizure. If so, an alterna-
tive to the exclusionary rule that addresses only fourth amendment
violations will not end the exclusionary rule controversy.
In sum, any alternative to the general remedy of exclusion must
not be assessed only by the way it serves constitutional functions, but
should be assessed also by its distinct effects on and solutions to fourth,
fifth, sixth, and fourteenth amendment police control problems. The
ideal alternative would be sensitive to, and would accommodate, the
purposes and values underlying these amendments.
The Rule Defined and Criticized
Scope of the Exclusionary Rule
Before considering significant criticisms of the exclusionary rule,
one must understand its scope. The rule is popularly criticized as hav-
ing almost universal sway, interfering with every aspect of criminal jus-
tice, and making law enforcement and prosecution exceptionally
difficult.66 As now applied in federal courts, the rule has a more lim-
ited scope.
Some of the substantive rules of search and seizure, such as the
permissible full body search during a custodial traffic arrest,67 seem to
have been designed partly to limit the consequences of the exclusionary
rule. It is not possible to determine to what degree substantive search
and seizure decisions have been influenced by the exclusionary remedy.
In some cases, it seems likely that, absent the threat of exclusion, some
courts might have articulated substantive law differently. 68 These cases
must be viewed as nonevident restrictions on the rule.
66. See, e.g., Leetham, Trott, Hirsch & Rogers, What the Experts Have to Say About
Crime, L.A. Times, Feb. 1, 1981, pt. 1, at 1, col. 1; Editorial, The Gann of Worms, Wall St. J.,
March 26, 1982, at 26, col. 1.
67. See United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973); Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S.
260 (1973).
68. "The inevitable question raised is whether the Court's decisions... are based on a
bona fide belief in the soundness of the 'deterrent effect' argument, or whether the Court's
use of this argument is merely a facade, fabricated to hide the real motivating factor behind
the Court's decisions-that factor being the reluctance to free a criminal because of a law
enforcement official's disregard for that criminal's constitutional rights." Note, Michigan v.
DeFillopo: Time to Resolve the Confusion Surrounding the Fourth Amendment Exclusionary
Rule, 7 OHIo N.U.L. REv. 170, 175 (1980) (footnote omitted). See generally Burkhoff, The
Court That Devoured the Fourth Amendment: The Triumph of an Inconsistent Doctrine, 58
OR. L. Rnv. 151 (1979).
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In addition to the substantive limitations on the rule, the Supreme
Court has held that exclusion of unlawfully seized evidence from the
prosecution's direct case adequately serves the deterrence function.
69
The rule, therefore, does not exclude improperly taken statements used
to impeach a defendant's testimony,70 and does not exclude evidence in
ancillary proceedings, such as grand jury investigations7I and sentenc-
ing hearings. 72 Similarly, exclusionary rule decisions that are not ap-
plications of settled law are not applied retroactively.
73
The doctrine of standing further limits the use of exclusion to deter
police misconduct. Within the last few years, perhaps because of the
exclusionary rule, the Supreme Court has reformed the rules about
who may challenge unlawful police conduct. Through Rakas v. Illi-
nois74 and its progeny,75 the Court has limited the class of persons who
may challenge searches and seizures to those whose legitimate expecta-
tion of privacy has been invaded by police.76 As a result of these
changes, some known unlawful police conduct will go unsanctioned.
77
Police may violate X's reasonable expectation of privacy to seize evi-
dence to be used against Y. Under Rakas and its progeny, Y cannot
complain because her personal right of privacy was not violated. X
cannot complain because police do not seek to use the evidence against
him. Evidence taken unlawfully is therefore admissible in such cases.
Although not strictly limitations on exclusion, other legal doctrines
also reduce the rule's effect. First, in accordance with Stone v. Powell,
78
federal courts have limited severely the use of habeas corpus to review
state search and seizure determinations.79 The absence of federal re-
69. See Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971); Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62
(1954).
70. United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620 (1980); Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222
(1971).
71. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
72. United States v. Schipani, 315 F. Supp. 253 (E.D.N.Y.), affid, 435 F.2d 26 (2d Cir.
1970); see I LAFAVE, supra note 38, § 1.4(f). But see People v. Belleci, 24 Cal. 3d 879, 598
P.2d 473, 157 Cal. Rptr. 503 (1979).
73. See United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 535 (1975).
74. 439 U.S. 128 (1978).
75. Eg., United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83 (1980); Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S.
98 (1980); United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727 (1980).
76. See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. at 143-48.
77. "[The Court's] holding effectively turns the standing rules created by this Court for
assertions of Fourth Amendment violations into a sword to be used by the Government to
permit it deliberately to invade one person's Fourth Amendment rights in order to obtain
evidence against another person." United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 738 (1980) (Mar-
shall, J., dissenting).
78. 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
79. See id at 492-95.
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view may result in some dilution of constitutional search and seizure
standards by state courts.80 Second, the harmless error rule also serves
to salvage convictions based partially on wrongfully obtained evi-
dence.81 Finally, the attenuation and independent source limitation on
the "fruits of the poisonous tree" doctrine may be stretched to check
use of the exclusionary rule.82 In addition to this settled law, a good
faith exception to the rule appears to be developing.8 3 The exception
permits the introduction of evidence illegally obtained when the police
error was merely a "technical violation" and was the result of a "good
faith mistake." 8
4
Criticisms of the Exclusionary Rule
When the exclusionary rule is attacked, the focus of such a chal-
lenge is often unclear. For example, when opponents claim that the
exclusionary rule "handcuffs" the police, is the objection to the remedy
of exclusion, or is it limited to the rules defining lawful police con-
duct?85 Absent an exclusionary rule, police still would have a constitu-
tional duty to abide by the fourth, fifth, and sixth amendments, and the
due process clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amendments. Dissatis-
faction with substantive rules can be transformed easily into a con-
firmed hostility to the sanction of exclusion. When the opposition is
80. Whether Stone v. Powell will operate in Miranda and other fifth or sixth amend-
ment applications of the exclusionary rule is unclear. See Schulhofer, Confessions and the
Court, 79 MICH. L. REv. 865 (1981).
81. See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
"The doctrine [of harmless error] is unmatched as a tool for the secret theft of constitu-
tional rights. A finding that a constitutional error is harmless is almost beyond question on
review .... If a state or federal appellate court chooses to use the harmless constitutional
error as a tool to emasculate a constitutional right through a consistent finding of harmless-
ness in a series of cases, it is likely to succeed without question." 'The effect of the doctrine
upon precedents defining constitutional criminal procedure-their creation, maintenance,
and change-is devastating." Goldberg, Harmless Error: Constitutional Sneak Thief, 71 J.
CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 421, 436, 441 (1980) (footnotes omitted).
82. See United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268 (1978); Wong Sun v. United States,
371 U.S. 471 (1963).
83. See Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31 (1979); United States v. Janis, 428 U.S.
433 (1976); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 540 (1976) (White, J., dissenting); United States v.
Peltier, 422 U.S. 433 (1975); Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974).
84. See United States v. Williams, 622 F.2d 830, 840-46 (5th Cir. 1980) (en banc), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 1127 (1981). While it has not yet ruled on the constitutionality of the good
faith exception, the Supreme Court has refused, on related grounds, to exclude evidence in
two cases. See Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31 (1979); Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S.
154 (1978) (by implication).
85. See J. KAPLAN, CRIMINAL JUSTICE 215-16 (2d ed. 1978); Kamisar, Is the Exclusion-
ary Rule an "Illogical" or "Unnatural" Interpretation ofthe Fourth Amendment?, 62 JUDICA-
TURE 66, 73-74 (1978).
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actually to the substantive constitutional standards, however, the exclu-
sionary rule is simply the messenger who brings bad news. Although
the immediate and irrational reaction is to destroy the messenger, the
news will remain the same.
Many attacks on the exclusionary rule may be misdirected and
should challenge instead either the substantive rules that courts have
fashioned to enforce constitutional rights or, more directly, judicial re-
view of police conduct. A challenge on the merits of a rule basically
accepts the system of judicial review; the latter does not. Given our
constitutional structure, abolishing the exclusionary rule to rid us of
judicial review of police conduct is unacceptable.
The following ten criticisms are the major objections to the exclu-
sionary rule itself.
The Rule Fails to Deter Police Misconduct
Two different criticisms of the exclusionary rule fall under this
heading. The first is a claim of principle. Many of the legal rules that
form the substantive basis for excluding evidence are not framed until
there is a challenge to a police practice. If certain conduct has not yet
been found unlawful, police cannot know that it is unlawful; there can
be no police misconduct in a novel situation until a court so deter-
mines. Thus, police would not be deterred by a subsequent decision
finding the conduct improper. 86 Accordingly, excluding evidence in
such cases is wrong because there is no misconduct to be deterred until
after the misconduct is identified and the rule is promulgated.
87
Although this criticism of the exclusionary rule superficially ap-
pears valid, it actually stems from the elementary mistake previously
noted. The objection is not to the exclusionary rule itself, but to judi-
cial rulemaking that restrains police activities. Any system that settles
uncertain or unclear law judicially will inevitably sanction conduct af-
ter the fact. If this objection were valid for judicial decisions regarding
police conduct, it would also be valid for judicial decisions in other
uncertain areas of the law, such as torts, family law, and property. The
criticism misses its mark; instead of targeting exclusion of evidence, it
should be aimed at general rulemaking applied retroactively.
86. See note 45 & accompanying text supra.
87. "[I]n any given instance the police officer may find that there is no court decision
which deals with the specific search contemplated, or that the cases which have considered
the issue are contradictory, or that the cases which deal with the issue are not clear in resolv-
ing it; it is simply not possible to know which course of conduct is lawful and which is
unlawful." Jensen, Exclusionary Rule.- A Denial of Justice, L.A. Daily J., Oct. 16, 1981, at 4
(Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, U.S. Dep't of Justice).
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Objection to retroactive application of the exclusionary system,
however, merits consideration. Until the particular decision declares
certain police conduct to be unconstitutional, the police not only acted
in good faith but also in accordance with the existing constitutional
limits. This would not be an objection, however, to governing police by
prospective rulemaking or to applying an exclusionary sanction only to
subsequent cases. Thus, legislative or administrative rulemaking or
constitutionally permitted advisory judicial opinions would satisfy this
basic criticism.
The second "no-deterrence" criticism of the exclusionary rule is an
empirical claim that the potential exclusion of evidence actually does
not deter police illegality. Exclusion does not discipline police officers
for violating civil liberties. Police forces have functions and values
other than seeking convictions, 8 principally maintaining order, and ex-
clusion, to whatever degree it deters, will not deter when no conviction
is sought. Finally, as a practical matter, police are often uninformed
about judicial rulings in cases they have handled.89 The degree to
which the rule actually deters is thus quite uncertain. As Professor La
Fave has stated:
Despite the lack of hard evidence proving deterrence and of a sound
quantitative measure of the extent of deterrence, it is not irresponsi-
ble to suggest: (i) that the hard evidence the rule does not deter
under certain circumstances fails to 'demonstrate the absence of all
deterrent potential'; and (ii) that a significant amount of deterrence
may be assumed from the fact that conviction of offenders remains
obviously an important objective of police activity.90
Whatever the actual deterrent effect of the rule, however, police today
have a far greater awareness of civil liberties than before the creation of
the rule.9 1
88. Although responsible for the prevention of crime, police also perform many public
service functions with the general aim of preventing disorder, protecting property, and en-
suring individual and community security. Police intervention routinely extends to non-
criminal situations, including attending to such public nuisances as loud dogs or parties,
helping inebriates, assisting lost tourists, and rescuing stranded motorists. The police also
serve a clerical function in recording and reporting crimes and accidents. Their role in
emergency situations, like earthquakes, is generally unrelated to criminal law enforcement.
See G. KILLINGER & P. CROMWELL, IssuEs IrN LAW ENFORCEMENT 211-25 (1975).
89. See Burger, Who Will Watch the Watchman?, 14 AM. U.L. REv. 1, 11 (1964);
Wright, Must the Criminal Go Free If the Constable Blunders?, 50 TEx. L. REv. 736, 740
(1972).'
90. 1 LAFAVE, supra note 38, § 1.2(b) (quoting Alien, Federalism andthe Fourth Amend-
ment:. Requiemfor Wolf, 1961 Sup. CT. Rv. 1, 39).
91. Professors Cann and Egbert argue that one of the services of the exclusionary rule
"is [as] a communication device, teaching and reinforcing democratic values." Cann & Eg-
bert, The Exclusionary Rule: Its Necessi in ConstitutionalDemocracy, 23 How. L.J. 299,317
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In assessing the operation and effectiveness of the exclusionary
rule as a police control device, specific deterrence is only a tangential
issue. Criticism of the exclusionary rule for failure to deter is mislead-
ing; it assumes we should adopt only those rules that are demonstrably
effective. In this, it neglects analogous applications of criminal law.
For example, it is unknown whether the death penalty deters the com-
mission of crimes, 92 yet there is a death penalty. Similarly, it is un-
known whether, or to what degree, the proscriptions and punishments
of the criminal code deter, yet they are not eliminated because it has
not been proven that they deter.
A central aim is to devise codes of conduct and standards for judg-
ment. "Deterrence is partly a matter of logic and psychology, largely a
matter of faith. The question is never whether laws do deter, but rather
whether conduct ought to be deterred . . . ,,93 The issue therefore is
not one of empirical fact but of normative principle: as a matter of
principle rather than utilitarian consequences alone, society chooses to
proscribe certain conduct.
The Rule Does Not Protect the Innocent
The rule, excluding unlawful evidence only in criminal trials, is a
remedy only for persons charged with crime. It therefore does not de-
ter police who are not interested in ensuring the subsequent direct use
of evidence. Any protection that the rule provides the innocent is but a
function of its general deterrent effect.94
This criticism of the rule is valid. Although the Supreme Court
has stated that exclusion is not a personal remedy for a violation of
constitutional rights, 95 it does not follow that there should not be some
effective remedy. A better system would provide some vindication for
invasions of the rights of the innocent.
(1980). Professor LaFave notes such post-exclusionary rule occurrences as the dramatic in-
crease in the use of search warrants, new and increased efforts to educate the police on the
law of search and seizure, and the development of working relationships between the police
and prosecutors with the goal of avoiding suppression. 1 LAFAVE, supra note 38, § 1.2(b).
92. For a full debate of the death penalty issue, see Baldus & Cole, A Comparison ofthe
Work of Thorsten Se/tin and Isaac Ehrlich on the Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment, 85
YALE L.J. 170 (1975); Bowers & Pierce, The Illusion of Deterrence in Isaac Ehrlich's Research
on Capita/Punishment, 85 YALE L.J. 187 (1975); Ehrlich, Rejoinder, 85 YALE L.J. 368 (1976);
Peck, The Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment: Ehrlich and His Critics, 85 YALE L.J. 359
(1976).
93. Dworkin, Fact Style Adjudication and the Fourth Amendment: The Limits of Law-
yering, 48 IND. L.J. 329, 333 (1973).
94. S. SCHLESINGER, EXCLUSIONARY INJUSTICE 60 (1977); Wilkey, supra note 3, at 223.
95. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347-48 (1974).
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The Rule Fails to Distinguish Between Small, Technical Violations
and Serious Violations
This criticism,96 a variant of the failure-to-deter argument, is one
of the grounds urged in support of a good faith exception to the exclu-
sionary rule.97 The objection suggests that the severity of remedy for
unlawful police conduct should be tied to the officer's culpability for
the offense. This assumes that the exclusion of evidence is intended
only to punish and fails to consider the rulemaking function of the ex-
clusionary rule. If the assumption is correct, this criticism is valid.
Suppose police, attempting to follow the rules of search and
seizure, go to a magistrate to obtain a search warrant. They file their
affidavit with the magistrate's clerk, but do not speak with the magis-
trate. Unknown to the officers, the magistrate issues the warrant with-
out reading the affidavit, although the affidavit does establish probable
cause. Although the police have done nothing wrong, these facts are
sufficient to support a motion to'suppress, and the evidence will be ex-
cluded.98 The fourth amendment violation, although significant, is
nonetheless technical because the police had probable cause. In this
and related situations,99 the exclusionary rule cannot be an effective
specific deterrent; exclusion as a disciplinary sanction alone is inappro-
priate for technical or good faith violations. If there is to be exclusion
nonetheless, it must be for some other reason.
The Rule Allows the Guilty to Go Free
Depending on the evidence remaining after exclusion, in some
cases the prosecutor may dismiss the case or suffer an acquittal. Theo-
retically, the rule can operate to prevent conviction of the guilty. 100
This objection is powerful and would be overwhelming if the prosecu-
tion frequently lost cases because of exclusion. There are, however,
few cases in which the evidence is so severely limited by application of
the rule that guilty persons are released. 10
96. Schlesinger, supra note 35, at 405; Wilkey, supra note 3, at 226.
97. See notes 137-50 & accompanying text infra.
98. See Rooker v. Commonwealth, 508 S.W.2d 570 (Ky. 1974); 3 LAFAVE, supra note
38, § 42(d).
99. Cf. Page v. State, 136 Ga. App. 807, 222 S.E.2d 661 (1975) (evidence suppressed
when magistrate checked technical correctness of affidavit, but systematically left determina-
tion of probable cause to officer involved).
100. Schlesinger, supra note 35, at 405.
101. See C. SILBERMAN, CRIMINAL VIOLENCE, CRIMINAL JusTIcE 262-63 (1978) (foot-
notes omitted); see also K. BRosi, A CRoss-Crry COMPARISON OF FELONY CASE PROCESS-
ING 18-20 (1979).
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A major reason for the limited effect of the rule on convictions is
that motions to suppress are seldom granted.102 They fail for various
reasons: they may not be meritorious; the allegations of misconduct
may not be provable; witnesses may reconstruct facts to conform to
testimonial needs; the credibility of police officers is greater than that of
the ordinary accused; police may lie to save evidence; and judges may
stretch facts or law to avoid suppression.10 3 Even if a motion to sup-
press is granted, enough untainted evidence may remain to obtain a
conviction. Similarly, even when an appellate court reverses a trial
court's denial of a motion to suppress, the harmless error rule may save
the conviction or there may be a conviction on retrial.104
The exclusionary rule, however, may play a far greater role in
plea-bargaining than in trials. Although the guilty rarely go free be-
cause of the rule, they may receive reduced charges or sentences. Of
these effects, the systemic result of the rule probably lies more in its
inducement to negotiate than in a remarkable reduction of sentences.
A pending suppression battle may cause a prosecutor to assess the
worth of the defendant's crime in terms of societal goals, an assessment
that rarely occurs at the initial charging stages. For a defendant, the
prospect of trading a risky motion to suppress for a reduced charge or
sentence may be appealing.
10 5
If the exclusionary rule operates in this manner in practice, as it
apparently does, the guilty do not unjustly benefit from it. The criti-
cism that the exclusionary rule frees the guilty is therefore generally
mistaken.
The Rule Withholds Credible Evidence from Trial
The rule can exclude highly probative physical evidence, such as
narcotics or weapons, or damning evidence such as a confession, from
trial. 106 This criticism is obviously related to the preceding one--that
the guilty go free. Even if the guilty are convicted despite the exclusion
of highly credible evidence, this criticism survives as an objection of
102. See K. BROSI, A CROSS-CITY COMPARISON OF FELONY CASE PROCESSING 18-20
(1979).
103. See, e.g., Wilkey, .4 Callfor 41ternatives to the Exclusionary Rule, 62 JUDICATURE
351, 355-56 (1979).
104. See generally MCCORMICK'S HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 183, at 431 &
n.86 (E. Cleary 2d ed. 1972).
105. Strangely enough, the exclusionary rule may give a defense attorney leverage with
his own client to accept a bargain that otherwise might be rejected.
106. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 489-90 (1976); Schlesinger, supra note 35, at 405;
Wilkey, supra note 3, at 220-21.
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principle: social decisions should be based on as comprehensive a
knowledge of the facts as possible. The exclusionary rule violates this
principle by keeping truth from the trier of fact.
This criticism reaches the heart of the justification for trials. It
may be countered by arguing that trials are not a good method for
determining facts, and that good reasons generally support limitations
on the truth-determining ability of trials. Furthermore, trials, particu-
larly criminal trials, serve several functions besides truth-finding, in-
cluding catharsis and reinforcement of community morality. The
exclusionary rule might then just be cited as another limitation com-
promising the discovery of truth for other important social goods.
Finding and basing judicial decisions upon the truth and control-
ling the uses of official force to protect civil liberties are equally impor-
tant values, but in operation they conflict. Truth-finding is
compromised, to some extent, so that police may be controlled. The
exclusionary rule reflects the struggle to resolve these competing values.
While these arguments place the charge that the exclu~i6n of evi-
dence keeps truth from trials in a different perspective, they are insuffi-
cient to rebut it. A system that both enhanced truth-finding and
ensured civil liberties by controlling police would be superior to exclu-
sion, which compromises the one for the other.
The issue is not only one of principle, however, but also one of
politics. The courts control police by compromising truth because legis-
latures have not attempted to control the police. If the police were
effectively regulated legislatively or administratively, the exclusionary
rule would serve little purpose. No legislature, however, has yet taken
on this task. To give up the exclusionary system without a replacement
is to surrender a major control over the police; while some truth is now
sacrificed for civil liberties, without the rule civil liberties would be
jeopardized.
The Rule Is Enforced Without Regard to the Seriousness
of the Defendant's Offense
Theoretically, some rules governing police behavior result from
balancing the needs of law enforcement against the seriousness of the
infringement produced by a particular police practice. 107 For example,
the Terry v. Ohio 108 stop-and-frisk rules and the various automobile
107. Schlesinger, supra note 35, at 405; see Kaplan, supra note 63, at 1046-49.
108. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
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stop-and-search rules'0 9 acknowledge differing degrees of privacy and
allow differing degrees of police intrusion into that privacy. An exten-
sion of reasoning is that the greater the law enforcement need, the
greater the infringement that can be tolerated. Therefore, for serious
crimes, substantive rules should be lenient, or evidence improperly ob-
tained should be admitted.
The emotional appeal of this argument is strong. The public is
more concerned with serious and violent crime than with other of-
fenses; police are subject to greater pressure to solve crimes involving
murder, assault, and rape than to investigate larceny offenses. More-
over, complicated and sometimes confused feelings arise from empathy
for crime victims. Although a victim has suffered direct personal or
property injury, his or her rights have also been violated. In cases of
death, injury, or personal violation, it seems irrational and unjust to
hinder vindication of a victim's rights because police have violated the
criminal's rights. This reaction is a combination of vengeance and the
belief that one who seriously violates another's rights places himself or
herself outside of the legal protections offered in society.
This emotional argument resists logical counterargument. Exclud-
ing evidence to ensure that police will not violate the rights of innocent
persons may not counterbalance the demand to punish the guilty. Most
people probably never have experienced a serious police infraction of
their rights and cannot imagine such an infringement. Everyone wants
police to catch criminals and, in certain circumstances, might agree to
give up some liberty to achieve that goal. Moreover, there is little em-
pirical knowledge of the extent to which police violate the civil liberties
of the innocent."10 When sentiments are as strong and facts as unclear
as they are on these matters, it is difficult to portray convincingly a
"known" criminal as an exemplary case for the protection of civil
liberties.
This criticism is strong because without public support laws are
difficult to enforce. The socially unacceptable results of the exclusion-
ary rule may make the rule ineffective and may impose unjustifiable
costs on the legal system. Therefore, a better alternative to the rule
must provide more acceptable results.
109. Eg., New York v. Belton, 101 S. Ct. 2860 (1981); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte,
428 U.S. 543 (1976); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975).
110. There may be more knowledge of police harassment and infractions in minority
and lower class communities. See Rights of Suspects, supra note 30, at 810-15.
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The Rule Promotes Disrespect for the Judicial System
If the rule frees the guilty, then the courts, in protecting the civil
liberties of the guilty, may endanger society."1' In addition, the courts
may be accused of unjustly permitting wrongdoers to escape proper
punishment; the judicial system seems to protect everyone but the vic-
tim and society. Thus, courts, in protecting the civil liberties of the
accused, may actually appear to prevent redress for victims. The sys-
tem, no matter how good its purposes, may give the appearance of alli-
ance with the criminal. The common citizen may be reasonable in
concluding that the system does not work. Furthermore, some persons
may rationalize their own unlawful acts on the grounds that the system
does not hold persons responsible for their crimes.
While this criticism may accurately describe public feeling, its
force is uncertain. People do complain about, and politicians effec-
tively campaign against, the courts. It does not follow, however, that
courts are losing their authority, or that people no longer abide by laws
because of disrespect for the legal system created by the exclusionary
rule."12 There are countless variable factors affecting the general public
attitude towards the system of justice. Disrespect may arise as much or
more from the fact that the police do not prevent crime as from exclu-
sion of evidence. Despite the importance of public allegiance and con-
fidence in the instruments of government, respect for the legal system is
thus nearly imponderable. There are many strong complaints that can
be made against the system of justice other than the fact that it enforces
the exclusionary rule. If the system fails, it will fail for many reasons in
addition to this symbolic issue.
The exclusionary rule is important, however, as an official model
of the government's refusal to tolerate any police illegality." 3 Because
of this, the public may be more law-abiding. As a symbol, however,
the rule admits contradictory interpretations. On one hand, the rule
supports the reasoning of the moralist: "Everyone must obey the law.
I 1. Wilkey, supra note 3, at 223.
112. The evidence regarding public attitudes on the judicial system, crime, and the ex-
clusionary rule is unclear. There appears to be a belief that courts are too concerned with
the rights of criminals, see PUBLIC OPINION, June/July 1979, at 32 (survey of first-year col-
lege students), that courts are not harsh enough, see PUBLIC OPINION, Aug./Sept. 1980, at
37; and that the system ofjustice is not very good, see L.A. Times, March 2, 1980, pt. 1, at 3,
col. 3. People do not have much confidence that police will protect them from crime or that
courts will convict or sentence criminals. See NEWSWEEK, March 23, 1981, at 47. On the
other hand, four out of five persons polled by the Los Angeles Times thought judges were
doing a good job. L.A. Times, supra. Only 20% of the persons polled by Newsweek thought
that court leniency was responsible for the increasing rate of crime. NEWSWEEK, supra.
113. See Tiffany, Judicial Attempts to Control the Police, 61 CURRENT HIsT. 13 (1971).
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Police, too, are bound by the law even when they attempt to prevent
crime or apprehend and help convict offenders. Law may not be disre-
garded to enforce law." On the other hand, the compromiser responds:
"All must obey the law, except that some violators will not be punished
although they are culpable. The law, which requires punishment of the
guilty, is not enforced to protect the rights of these offenders. There-
fore, one law may be disregarded to enforce another."
On the level at which most members of the general public are
likely to consider these matters, these are radically inconsistent posi-
tions. As a behavioral guide from government, the "omnipresent
teacher," 1 4 the apparent contradiction can only confuse. Escape from
the social and legal consequences of one's behavior is a message that
appears to be reinforced throughout the legal system. The situation is
especially serious if a significant percentage of the public draws this
conclusion from the exclusionary rule. Although not attributable solely
to the psychological message given by the exclusionary rule, a better
alternative should avoid, as much as possible, this message.
The Rule Encourages Police Perjury and Judicial Hypocrisy
Police may lie about their acts to avoid the suppression of evi-
dence. In addition, judges may interpret testimony favorably to the
police or may strain to construe controlling cases to avoid suppressing
evidence. 15 These charges indicate serious problems.
116
However effectively the exclusionary rule may control police, po-
lice perjury and judicial complicity seriously undermine its effects.
Furthermore, it is ironic that a rule devised to protect the integrity of
the legal system promotes surface integrity and subterranean fraud. To
the extent that police lie and judges look aside or make strained inter-
pretations, the judicial system has institutionalized sham.
The fact that police may lie, and that judges may use judicial fact-
finding and legal interpretation to avoid excluding evidence, does not
necessarily lead to the conclusion that there should be no exclusionary
rule. Police should not lie and judges should be paragons of the honest
exercise of legal duty. It is, however, a mistake to separate a person's
interest from his or her duty. Understandably, police officers who are
aware of a defendant's actual guilt because they know the evidence,
114. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
115. Oaks, supra note 38, at 739-42; Schlesinger, supra note 35, at 405; Sevilla, The Ex-
clusionary Rule and Police Perjury, 11 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 839 (1974); Wilkey, supra note 3,
at 355-56.
116. See Wilkey, supra note 3, at 355-56.
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and judges, may face a conflict when they are expected to accept and
endorse exclusion of this evidence. Implicit in this criticism is the sug-
gestion that the rule is so bad, so contrary to the feelings and sensibili-
ties of ordinary human nature regarding known criminals, that even
legally responsible people, such as police and judges, will not obey it.
Law avoidance, either through shading facts or through favorable
legal interpretation, exists throughout the legal system. Whenever peo-
ple wish to avoid the consequences of a law, fact finding and law inter-
preting are distorted. The issue is one of degree: how widespread is the
problem and how serious is it? There is no systematic way to answer
these questions with respect to the effect of exclusion. Nonetheless, it
would be better to remove this conflict among duty, emotion, and
knowledge by enforcing civil liberties through some mechanism other
than exclusion of evidence at trial.
The Rule Causes Serious Confusion and Distortion of the Law
To avoid the consequeilces of excluding evidence, courts liberally
interpret the law to permit the introduction of unlawfully seized evi-
dence. The pressure of the exclusionary rule forces strained judicial
analysis to ensure the admission of probative evidence." 7 In lower
courts, this sometimes leads to technical holdings inconsistent with the
rationales of controlling cases. 1 8 It also leads to voluminous appellate
litigation"19 and the development of different specific rules and stan-
117. Confusion and distortion are evident on several levels. One commentator argues
that they emanate in the first instance from the Supreme Court's rulings regarding imple-
mentation of the exclusionary rule: "[T]he Burger Court has responded to fourth amend-
ment challenges with doctrinal schizophrenia, obscuring as a result the actual theoretical or
ideological basis for its exclusionary rulings." Burkhoff, The Court That Devoured the Fourth
Amendment: The Triumph of an Inconsistent Doctrine, 58 OR. L. REv. 151, 191 (1979). At
the level of police and trial court enforcement, there are few clear guidelines. "State and
federal law enforcement officers and prosecutorial authorities must find quite intolerable
this present state of uncertainty, which extends even to such an everyday question as the
circumstances under which police may enter a man's property to arrest him and seize a
vehicle believed to have been used during the commission of a crime." Coolidge v. New
Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 490 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring).
118. In New York v. Belton, 101 S. Ct. 2860 (1981), Justice Stewart noted the disarray in
the lower courts on the question of the proper scope of a search of the interior of an automo-
bile incident to a lawful arrest. Id at 2863. Compare United States v. Sanders, 631 F.2d
1309 (8th Cir. 1980) (upholding search) and United States v. Dixon, 558 F.2d 919 (9th Cir.
1977) (same) and United States v. Frick, 490 F.2d 666 (5th Cir. 1973) (same) with United
States v. Benson, 631 F.2d 1336 (8th Cir. 1980) (holding search constitutionally invalid) and
United States v. Rigales, 630 F.2d 364 (5th Cir. 1980) (same).
119. See Mertens & Wasserstrom, The Good Faith Exception to the Exclusionary Rule:
Deregulating the Police and Derailing the Law, 70 GEo. L.J. 365, 401-06 (1981) (development
of fourth amendment case law).
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dards in different jurisdictions. 20
In the United States Supreme Court, this process has led to signifi-
cant limitations on the scope of the exclusionary rule' 21 and to sophisti-
cated, complicated, and confusing decisions. Many important cases are
plurality opinions,122 and the lower courts, as well as law enforcement
officials, have enormous difficulty understanding and applying them.
Competing lines of cases seem inconsistent and can be reconciled only
through a sophisticated sifting and distinguishing of facts and
rationales. 12
3
Apart from distortions of law attributable to judges' differing sub-
stantive views and efforts to avoid exclusion, the substantive law is in-
herently complicated because it develops through adjudication. The
legal rationales underlying many of the substantive rules enforcing the
fourth, fifth, and sixth amendments rely on specific facts. For example,
whether a particular Chimel v. California 124 search and seizure is lawful
may depend on the number of officers securing or immobilizing the
arrestee or on the suspect's physical position. 125 While this subtlety
120. Compare United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973) with People v. Brisendine,
13 Cal. 3d 528, 531 P.2d 1099, 119 Cal. Rptr. 315 (1975).
121. See text accompanying notes 67-84 supra.
122. E.g., Robbins v. California, 101 S. Ct. 2841 (1981); Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583
(1974); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 433 (1971).
123. Compare New York v. Belton, 101 S. Ct. 2860 (1981) (search upheld) and Gustaf-
son v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260 (1973) (same) and United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218
(1973) (same) with Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979) (search held unconstitutional)
and United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977) (same) and Chimel v. California, 395 U.S.
752 (1969) (same).
For example, Justice Powell, in Robbins v. California, 101 S. Ct. 2841 (1981) (Powell,
J., concurring), has referred to the automobile search cases as "intolerably confusing," id at
2848, and a "benighted area of law," id at 2851. He blamed the exclusionary rule for this
state of affairs: "Much of this difficulty [in automobile search cases] comes from the neces-
sity of applying the general command of the Fourth Amendment to ever-varying facts; more
may stem from the often unpalatable consequences of the exclusionary rule, which spur the
Court to reduce its analysis to simple mechanical rules so that the constable has a fighting
chance not to blunder." Id at 2848.
124. 395 U.S. 752 (1969). In Chimel, the Court stated that, in addition to searching an
arrested person for weapons, the arresting officer may search for and seize any evidence on
the arrestee's person to prevent its destruction and may search "the area into which an arres-
tee might reach in order to grab a weapon or evidentiary items," thus allowing "a search of
the arrestee and the area 'within his immediate control.'" Id at 763.
125. If a defendant is handcuffed, the search of a nearby area may not be within his or
her control. United States v. Berenguer, 562 F.2d 206, 210 (2d Cir. 1977); United States v.
Baca, 417 F.2d 103, 105 (10th Cir. 1969). Conversely, the fact that a defendant is not hand-
cuffed has been stressed to justify a search of an adjacent area. See United States v.
Weaklem, 517 F.2d 70, 72 (9th Cir. 1975); United States v. Becker, 485 F.2d 51, 55 (6th Cir.
1973); United States v. Patterson, 447 F.2d 424, 426-27 (10th Cir. 1971). Furthermore,
whether a defendant's hands are handcuffed in front of or behind him or her may make a
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and sophistication are characteristic of common law adjudication, law
responsive "to every relevant shading of every relevant variation of
every relevant complexity"' 26 confuses and frustrates officers attempt-
ing to follow the law.' 27
If the exclusionary rule is to be an effective deterrent, the substan-
tive rules it enforces "must be clear, unambiguous, not susceptible to
quibbles or easy avoidance, and easily understandable by the persons
sought to be deterred."' 28 The Supreme Court has begun to devise
rules that simply and clearly define the lawful authority of police of-
ficers. The Court's decision in New York v. Belton,129 holding that the
Chimel search area in an automobile is the entire passenger compart-
ment, expresses a realization of the need for "straight-forward rule[s],
easily applied, and predictably enforced."'
130
Yet the movement towards simple, "bright-line" rules has its own
costs. The substantive law, as finally articulated in the compromise to-
wards simplicity, may inadequately protect civil liberties. To avoid the
exclusion of evidence, the underlying substantive rule may be framed
to permit police practices that would not be acceptable absent the ex-
clusionary rule. For example, it is unlikely that full body searches on
arrests for minor traffic offenses and other minor infractions would be
difference. See United States v. Jones, 475 F.2d 723, 727-28 (5th Cir. 1973); United States v.
Baca, 417 F.2d 103, 105 (10th Cir. 1969).
The position of the officers may also be significant. If the officer is close to the defend-
ant, or between the defendant and the place searched, Chimel rules prohibit the search.
United States v. Mapp, 476 F.2d 67, 80 (2d Cir. 1973); see also United States v. Jones, 475
F.2d 723, 727-28 (5th Cir. 1973). A more extended search may be upheld if no officer is
close by. United States v. Becker, 485 F.2d 51, 55 (6th Cir. 1973).
Similarly, the number and relative positions of officers, and number of arrestees and
others present, may be considered. See United States v. Mapp, 476 F.2d 67, 80 (2d Cir.
1973); United States v. Jones, 475 F.2d 723, 727-28 (5th Cir. 1973); United States v.
Manarite, 314 F. Supp. 607, 613, 616 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), a i'd, 448 F.2d 583 (2d Cir. 1971);
People v. Williams, 57 Ill. 2d 239, 243-46, 311 N.E.2d 681, 684-85 (1974); 2 LAFAVE, supra
note 38, § 6.3.
126. Perspectives, supra note 30, at 375.
127. "A highly sophisticated set of rules, qualified by all sorts of ifs, ands, and buts, and
requiring the drawing of subtle nuances and hairline distinctions, may be the sort of heady
stuff upon which the facile minds of lawyers and judges eagerly feed, but they may be 'liter-
ally impossible of application by the officer in the field."' LaFave, "Case-by-CaseAdjudlca-
tion" versus "Standardized Procedures's The Robinson Dilemma, 1974 Sup. CT. REV. 127,
141 (footnote omitted) (quoting United States v. Robinson, 471 F.2d 1082, 1122 (D.C. Cir.
1972) (en banc) (Wilkey, J., dissenting), rev'd, 414 U.S. 218 (1973)).
128. Dworkin, Fact Style Adjudication and the Fourth Amendment: The Limits of Law-
yering, 48 IND. L.J. 329, 333 (1973).
129. 101 S. Ct. 2860 (1981).
130. Id at 2863. But cf. Robbins v. California, 101 S. Ct. 2841, 2847-50 (1981) (Powell,
J., concurring) (some "bright-line" rules may be too burdensome for police).
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permitted if the remedy for an unlawful search were disciplining the
officer rather than excluding the evidence.1
3 '
The threat of exclusion distorts constitutional issues and results in
confused police control law. If exclusion deters unlawful police con-
duct, the complexity and confusion in the substantive law seriously
limit its effectiveness, frustrate good faith efforts to apply it, and
threaten to generate a new body of rules that inadequately protect civil
liberties. Thus, a better alternative to the rule should avoid fostering
such judicial complexity and inconsistency.
The Existence of the Rule Discourages the Adoption of Alternatives
It can no longer be assumed that other branches of government will
act while judges cling to this Draconian, discredited device in its
present absolutist form. . . . [Olverruling this judicially contrived
doctrine--or limiting its scope to egregious, bad faith conduct-
would inspire a surge of activity toward providing some kind of stat-
utory remedy for persons injured by police mistakes or
misconduct. '
32
This criticism of the rule ignores the fact that legislatures have had
neither the will nor the ingenuity to devise a better alternative. 133 To
end the reign of exclusion without replacing it with another regent
would be to authorize police lawlessness. 34 The Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court has invited Congress to devise alternatives to the exclu-
sionary rule. 135 Many bills have been introduced to change it or to
131. See Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260 (1973); United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S.
218 (1973); LaFave, "Case-by-Case Adjudication" versus "Standardized Procedures" The
Robinson Dilemma, 1974 Sup. CT. REV. 127 (critiquing the Robinson rule).
It is also unlikely that the search of a locked suitcase in the passenger compartment
would be permitted. This is, however, the apparent rule of New York v. Belton, 101 S. Ct.
2860 (1981): "[T]he police may also examine the contents of any containers found within
the passenger compartment, for if the passenger compartment is within reach of the arrestee,
so also will containers in it be within his reach." Id at 2864. Since the authority for a Belton
search stems from the authority to arrest, see United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218
(1973), and not from an articulable concern for an officer's safety, see Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. 1 (1968), there is a reasonable argument that officers may open a locked suitcase in the
passenger compartment without a warrant.
132. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 500-01 (1976) (Burger, C.J., concurring).
133. Wilkey, supra note 3, at 227.
134. "To overrule Weeks and Mapp, even assuming the Court was now prepared to take
that step, could raise yet new problems. Obviously the public interest would be poorly
served if law enforcement officials were suddenly to gain the impression, however erroneous,
that all constitutional restraints on police had somehow been removed-that an open season
on 'criminals' had been declared." Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388,
420-21 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
135. "Congress should develop an administrative or quasi-judicial remedy against the
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provide alternative remedies,136 but with few positive results.
Principled reasons for the failure of legislatures to provide a solu-
tion are difficult to find. The repeated failure of the different legislative
proposals to remedy police misconduct, however, demonstrates that
more than a remedy is at stake in the existing structure of the exclu-
sionary system.
The foregoing review of major criticisms of the exclusionary rule
may be synthesized and summarized as follows.
Summary
The exclusionary rule operates as a remedy only in a limited set of
circumstances. Although the specific effectiveness of the rule as a de-
terrent to unlawful police conduct is uncertain, it appears to deter as
well as any other law directly regulating conduct. It deters some, but
not all, police illegality; in doing so, it protects to a degree the civil
liberties of the innocent.
As a sanction or remedy for police misconduct, the exclusionary
rule may operate disproportionately, thereby losing significant public
support and police obedience. The rule also fails to provide a remedy
for innocent persons whose liberties are violated by police.
Relatively few guilty persons actually go free because of exclusion
of evidence, but the rule may play a significant role in plea-bargaining
and may result in reduced sentences in some cases. When the rule does
exclude evidence, verdicts are based on fewer than all the facts, and the
goal of decisions based on full knowledge is not well served. Accord-
ingly, police and judges may seek to prevent exclusion and may some-
times act dishonestly to avoid it.
The substantive law of exclusion is unclear, complex, and difficult
to apply. This law confuses officers, multiplies litigation, and otherwise
limits the rule's effectiveness as a deterrent. Moreover, the exclusion-
ary rule does not bar the creation of other means of dealing with police
misconduct.
Unless these criticisms hide more basic and unstated .objections of
the substantive law of the fourth, fifth, sixth, and fourteenth amend-
ments, none of the criticisms is directed to the constitutional functions
of the exclusionary system. Objections to the substantive law concern
judicial review of -police activities or concern particular rulings.
government itself to afford compensation and restitution for persons whose Fourth Amend-
ment rights have been violated." Id at 422. (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
136. See S. SCHLESINGER, EXCLUSIONARY INJUSTICE 89 (1977) (table of congressional
bills proposed between 1971 and 1975; none was enacted).
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Notwithstanding the continuing controversy it creates, judicial review
for protection of civil liberties is a necessary and well-established insti-
tution in our society. Any challenge to the exclusionary rule that is
actually a challenge to judicial review should be rejected.
It may be possible to satisfy the valid criticisms of the exclusionary
rule without sacrificing the constitutional functions that it serves. The
task, then, is to devise a system that accomplishes beneficial and neces-
sary purposes now achieved by the system of exclusion while avoiding
the valid criticisms of the rule.
A constitutionally acceptable alternative should maintain judicial
review, provide institutional adversary challenges to police practices,
develop and publicize clear and readily applicable rules defining lawful
police authority, and discipline police while providing an appropriate
personal remedy for police violations of civil liberties. It should not
rely on exclusion of evidence as its primary means of controlling police.
Two Alternatives to Exclusion
The Good Faith Exception
A good faith "exception" to the exclusionary rule has been pro-
moted to relax the rule's "Draconian" rigors. Four Justices of the
Supreme Court have indicated that they favor such an exception, 137 a
presidential task force on crime has strongly recommended its adop-
tion, 138 and the Fifth Circuit has adopted it. 139 The California
Supreme Court has been urged to adopt it, but has declined to do so. 140
The basic argument for the good faith exception is that, when an
officer is acting under the reasonable belief that his or her acts are au-
thorized by law, the officer cannot be deterred by the threat of exclu-
sion. Consequently, evidence seized should not be excluded when
there was only a "technical violation" of the law, when an officer acted
137. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 501 (1976) (Burger, C.J., concurring); id at 538-39
(White, J., dissenting); Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 611-12 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring
in part); United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 536-38 (1975) (Rehnquist, J.); Michigan v.
Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 447 (1974) (Rehnquist, J.); see Ball, Good Faith and the Fourth Amend-
ment: The 'Reasonable" Exception to the Exclusionary Rule, 69 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 635,
649-55 (1978); see also United States v. Santucci, 509 F. Supp. 177, 183 (N.D. Ill. 1981).
138. ATTORNEY GENERAL'S TASK FORCE ON VIOLENT CRIME, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
FINAL REPORT 55 (1981).
139. United States v. Williams, 622 F.2d 830 (5th Cir. 1980) (en banc), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 1127 (1981).
140. See People v. Teresinski, 30 Cal. 3d 822, 831 n.6, 640 P.2d 753, 758 n.6, 180 Cal.
Rptr. 617, 622 n.6 (1982).
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on the basis of law later held unconstitutional, 141 or when an officer
reasonably but erroneously interpreted the law.1
42
On first impression, the good faith doctrine is attractive. Unfortu-
nately, the facial charm of the good faith exception deceptively masks
its real features. The simple logic of the doctrine is wrong, .and its use
would severely undermine the purposes of the exclusionary rule. Fur-
thermore, adoption of the good faith exception would only exacerbate
some problems of the legal system that now prompt criticism of the
exclusionary rule.
The foundation of the good faith exception is the claim that the
only purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter the unlawful actions of
a particular officer. Thus, if an officer has made an objectively reason-
able mistake of law, he or she could not have been deterred from acting
illegally; therefore, there should be no exclusion.
This argument ignores most of the functions of the exclusionary
rule discussed above. Even taking it on its own terms, however, it is
wrong. The argument for the good faith exception confuses specific
deterrence with general deterrence, and it is the latter that the Supreme
Court has explicitly recognized as the aim of the exclusionary rule.
The proper question under the deterrence rationale is not whether an
individual officer could be deterred when he or she acts in good faith,
which is a question of specific deterrence, but rather, whether exclusion
of evidence in one case will deter police violations of civil liberties in
general. 143 The emphasis of the question of general deterrence is on
whether, notwithstanding the officer's good faith, exclusion will make
other officers in similar situations in the future question whether they
have the authority for their planned actions.44 If exclusion has this
effect, officers will know or will find out how to act. This is the norma-
tive, rulemaking aspect of the exclusionary system.
The argument for the good faith exception is based on the assump-
tion that the deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule operates by
punishing the offending officer. There are two problems with this as-
sumption. First, exclusion of evidence is not, in any meaningful sense,
a "punishment" visited on an individual. It is better viewed as a cor-
141. United States v. Williams, 622 F.2d 830, 841 (5th Cir. 1980) (en banc), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 1127 (1981).
142. Id at 843-44.
143. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347-48 (1974); see also 1 LAFAVE, supra
note 38, at § 1.2; Dworkin, Fact Style Adjudication andthe FourthAmendment: The Limits of
Lawyering, 48 IND. L.L 329, 330-31 (1973).
144. See Perspectives, supra note 30, at 431-32. See text accompanying notes 86-93
supra.
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rection than a punishment. Second, and more importantly, the as-
sumption confuses the imposition of sanctions for an individual's act
with exemplary "punishment." Although it may seem wrong to impose
sanctions where there simply has been an honest mistake, this is done
so that the mistake will not be repeated. Sanctions are imposed on the
act, rather than on motivations, intentions, or understandings of the
individual who believed his or her conduct to be proper, but did the
wrong thing.
In good faith cases, if a good faith exception is adopted, a court
first would determine whether the officer made a mistake and honestly
was wrong about the law. If the officer acted in good faith, and regard-
less of the invasion of an individual's civil liberties, the court would
then allow the evidence to be introduced, because the officer's error
would be excused. The acts would not be sanctioned, and the govern-
ment would thus be able to use the fruits of the unlawful action. The
exclusion of evidence, however, should be viewed as a sanction against
an act of government. Although the agent is blameless, the government
should not be allowed to profit from the agent's error.
Similar reasoning applies in other areas, such as strict liability
crimes and products liability cases. When public health or safety are
involved, liability without fault is often imposed as a matter of pol-
icy. 14 5 The facts relating to defect are uniquely within the control of
the manufacturer or producer and the utmost care must be taken in
manufacturing products to protect consumers; the good faith of the
manufacturer is no defense.
146
Similar policies operate in criminal law. Mistakes of fact are ex-
cused, but mistakes of law usually are not, even if made in good
faith.147 Thus, although the criminal law does not deter a violator who
makes a reasonable good faith mistake about the law, the violator may
yet be punished. For example, one may reasonably believe that the law
permits the killing of a thief to protect valuable property. If a person
sets a shotgun trap in his or her home to kill any intruder, however, the
honest belief will not excuse these acts in a criminal prosecution for a
burglar's death. 148 If death results, a conviction is warranted. Good
faith mistakes about criminal law usually are not excused.
145. See, e.g., United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 280-81 (1943) (strict liability
crime); Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 62-64, 377 P.2d 897, 900-01, 27 Cal.
Rptr. 697, 700-01 (1963) (strict products liability in tort).
146. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
147. See W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, CRIMINAL LAW § 47, at 362-65 (1972).
148. Id. § 55, at 401.
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The reasons for not excusing good faith criminal violations also
apply to good faith violations of civil liberties, and the cases should be
treated similarly. As one who makes a good faith mistake of law is
unlikely to be punished as severely as a purposeful transgressor, an of-
ficer who unwittingly violates the exclusionary rule has a good faith
defense to a civil action for violation of civil rights, 149 and should not
be subject either to an investigation or to police discipline. Nonethe-
less, the officer's unlawful, albeit good faith, act as agent for the gov-
ernment should justify imposing a sanction upon the prosecution; the
government should not be allowed to use evidence obtained
unlawfully.
Taken to its extreme, the failure-to-deter rationale of the good
faith exception would disembowel the exclusionary rule. This possibil-
ity shows the error in the current conceptualization of the purposes un-
derlying the exclusionary rule. The natural extension of the failure-to-
deter rationale is that because, as an empirical matter, the exclusionary
rule does not deter police from unlawful action, whether or not police
are acting in good faith, it never should be applied to exclude evidence.
Thus, the use of a utilitarian specific deterrence rationale, rather than
normative proscription, as the exclusive justification for the exclusion-
ary rule leaves the'rule without foundation or justification.
Apart from the legal unsoundness of the rationale behind the good
faith exception, its adoption would have adverse consequences of the
kind that have prompted strong criticism of the exclusionary rule. The
good faith exception would complicate an already complicated law and
tie up courts and officers in difficult litigation over police actions.
Cases in which the good faith exception is invoked would involve
two-tiered adjudications. There would first be the usual determination
of what the law actually requires or prohibits. Then the court would
determine the objective reasonableness of the officer's actions, and
make an exceptionally difficult inquiry into good faith. While the pro-
cess is itself problematic, eventually a whole separate body of law
would develop to define when an officer acted reasonably. As specific
facts, awareness of facts, and states of mind are usually important in
reasonableness determinations, this jurisprudence, like much of police
conduct law, will depend on fine shadings of fact. To an already fact-
sensitive body of police control law, another and more complicated
corpus would be added. In effect, the text will disappear beneath the
interpretations.
149. See Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 555-57 (1967).
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Although the exclusionary system, even with the adoption of a
good faith exception, would continue to serve the constitutional func-
tions described previously, it would serve them far less well than it now
does. There would continue to be rulemaking by the judiciary, defense
attorneys would continue to have some incentive to raise police con-
duct issues, and there would be some public education. All of these,
however, would be immeasurably complicated by the second-tier anal-
ysis that the exception would require. 150 Moreover, the deterrence and
remedial constitutional functions of the exclusionary rule would disap-
pear beneath the heavy gloss of exception.
Administrative Agency Regulation of Police Conduct
The exclusionary rule is an essential part of a system of police con-
trol that far transcends the rule itself. It was shaped to fit a certain
structure and is essential to that structure. Removing the exclusionary
rule from the existing system of police control might cause the system
to collapse. No other "remedy" or alternative can fill its role in the
same practical system. To remove the exclusionary rule without suffer-
ing a collapse of the system, the entire system of police control must be
changed. To eliminate the alleged evils of the rule without giving up
the constitutional functions that it uniquely serves, another system
must be adopted that will serve these roles.
The only alternative system of police control that could approxi-
mate the constitutional work of the exclusionary system is legislative or
administrative agency control. Administrative rulemaking for police is
not a novel proposition; judges and scholars have proposed it.' 1 Ad-
ministrative agency control of police, as used here, however, includes
control more comprehensive than that effected by internal police disci-
pline,152 citizen review boards,153 or police departmental rulemaking. 1
54
150. See United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 552-53 (1975) (Brennan, J., dissenting);
Kaplan, supra note 63, at 1044-45.
151. The original source for the idea of administrative rulemaking for the police appears
to be PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUS-
TICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 103-06 (1967). Since then, the idea
has received enthusiastic support and has been developed in interesting ways. See generally
K. DAVIS, POLICE DISCRETION (1975); K. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY
INQUIRY (1969); Perspectives, supra note 30; Rights of Suspects, supra note 30; Kaplan, supra
note 63; McGowan, Rule-making and the Police, 70 MICH. L. REV. 659 (1974); Quinn, The
Effect of Police Rulemaking on the Scope of Fourth Amendment Rights, 52 J. URB. L. 25
(1974); Wright, Beyond Discretionary Justice, 81 YALE L.J. 575 (1972); Comment, Judicially
Required Rulemaking as Fourth Amendment Policy: An Applied Analysis of the Supervisory
Power of Federal Courts, 72 Nw. U.L. REV. 595 (1978).
152. See R. KNOOHUIZEN, THE QUESTION OF POLICE DISCIPLINE IN CHICAGO: AN
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It means instead an agency of statewide jurisdiction with both rulemak-
ing and adjudicative powers, whose actions and decisions are reviewed
by appellate courts. Statewide jurisdiction is needed to ensure uniform
and systematic rules. Rulemaking power is needed to articulate specific
standards under the broad commands of the Constitution, adjudicative
power to impose sanctions for violations of the rules and to provide
remedies for police violations of civil liberties. Both are needed to keep
the public informed and to provide incentives to challenge, remedy,
and deter unlawful police practices. Judicial review is essential to de-
termine the appropriateness under the Constitution of agency-devised
police conduct rules and to supervise the agency's exercise of power
and discretion.
Agency rulemaking in criminal justice matters has several advan-
tages that judicial rulemaking lacks. Courts are too removed from day-
to-day police activity to frame adequate regulatory rules. Cases reach
ANALYSIS OF THE PROPOSED OFFICE OF PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS (1974); Barton, Civilian
Review Boards and the Handling of Complaints Against the Police, 20 U. TORONTO L.J. 448
(1970); Coe, The ALl Substantiality Test: 4 Flexible Approach to the Exclusionary Sanction,
10 GA. L. REv. 1 (1975-76); Davidow, CriminalProcedure Ombudsman as a Substitutefor the
Exclusionary Rule: A Proposal, 4 TEX. TECH. L. REv. 317 (1973); Geller, Enforcing the
Fourth Amendment: The Exclusionary Rule and Its Alternatives, 1975 WASH. U.L.Q. 621
(1975); Goode, Administrative Systemsfor the Resolution of Complaints Against the Police: A
ProposedReform, 5 ADEL. L. REv. 55 (1973); Hudson, Organizational-Aspects of Internal and
External Review of the Police, 63 J. CRiM. L. 427 (1972); Note, he Administration of Com-
plaints by Civilians Against the Police, 77 HARV. L. REv. 499 (1964).
153. See ACLU, POLICE POWER AND CITIZENS' RIGHTS: THE CASE FOR AN INDEPEND-
ENT POLICE REVIEW BOARD (1966); R. KNOOHUIZEN, THE QUESTION OF POLICE DISCI-
PLINE IN CHICAGO: AN ANALYSIS OF THE PROPOSED OFFICE OF PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS
(1974); D. SCHULTZ, SPECIAL PROBLEMS IN LAW ENFORCEMENT (1971); W. TURNER, THE
POLICE ESTABLISHMENT (1968); Barton, Civilian Review Boards and the Handling of Com-
plaintsAgainst the Police, 20 U. TORONTO L.J. 448 (1970); Berger, Law Enforcement Controk
Checks and Balances for the Police System, 4 CONN. L. REv. 467 (1971-72); Burger, Who
Will Watch the Watchman?, 14 AM. U.L. REv. 1 (1964); Coke, The Philadelphia Police Advi-
sory Board, 2 L. IN TRANS. Q. 179 (1975); Goode, Administrative Systensfar the Resolution
of Complaints Against the Police: 4 Proposed Reform, 5 ADEL. L. REv. 55 (1973); Hudson,
The Civilian Review Board Issue as Illuminated by the Philadelphia Experience, 6:3 CRIMINO-
LOGICA 16 (1968); Hudson, Organizational Aspects of Internal and External Review of the
Police, 63 J. CIuM. L. 427 (1972); Hudson, Police Review Boards and Police Accountability,
36 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 515 (1971); Neier, Civilian Review Boards-Another View, 2:8
CRiM. L. BULL. 10 (1966); Niederhoffer, Restraint of the Force: A Recurrent Problem, I
CONN. L. REV. 288 (1968); Norris, Constitutional Law Enforcement Is Effective Law Enforce-
ment: Toward a Concept of Police in a Democracy and a Citizen's Advisory Board, 43 U.
DET. L. REv. 203 (1965); RocheA Viable Substitutefor the Exclusionary Rule: A Civil Rights
Appeal Board, 30 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 233 (1973); Wingo, Gro wing Disillusionment with the
Exclusionary Rule, 25 Sw. L.J. 573 (1971); Note, The Administration of Complaints by Civil-
iansAgainst the Police, 77 HARV. L. REV. 499 (1964); Comment, Police-Piladephia'r Po-
lice Advisory Board--A New Concept in Community Relations, 7 VILL. L. REv. 656 (1962).
154. See note 151 supra.
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the courts almost fortuitously, not systematically, and therefore not in a
fashion that presents "any comprehensive set of issues relative to sus-
pects' rights."' 55 In addition, the workload of the Supreme Court al-
lows it to handle only a few criminal justice cases a year.
156
Furthermore, courts must develop rules on the basis of restricted
trial records. Trials entail a limited and narrow development of rele-
vant facts. While a trial thus provides a sharp and precise focus, it does
not provide a wide-angle view. Many facts that would be relevant to
the development of rules regarding police practices are not within the
limited purview of most trial and appellate proceedings. 1
57
Agency rulemaking, in contrast, would allow criminal justice is-
sues to be considered comprehensively in their appropriate and full
contexts. As rulemaking would be separated from determinations of
guilt, the possibility of releasing guilty defendants would no longer af-
fect the shape of the rules. 158 With fewer principles laid down on the
basis of unique facts, and with rules developed with a view to their
interrelationships, the law would develop in a more intelligible pattern.
Agency rulemaking thus could both clarify and simplify the law and
lead to more understandable and more easily administrable rules.
159
155. Rights ofSuspects, supra note 30, at 789. "The cases which do come to the Court
are selected by a process that can only be described as capricious insofar as it may be relied
upon to present the Court any opportunity for systematic development of a body of legal
rights of individuals in the police, or precourt, phases of criminal proceedings. Therefore,
the Court's ability to serve as architect of such a body of rights is woefully slight." Id at
790.
156. Id at 788.
157. Before the United States Supreme Court, however, there is a large amicus curiae
practice that exposes the Court to more information and different important points of view.
Decisions like Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), or Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968),
reflect broad bases of information apart from the simple trial record, and this in part ac-
counts for their legislative character. This kind of practice, however, is exceptional; in effect,
courts have had to act something like legislatures to devise police control rules that do not
jeopardize the police mission. Because of this, the appropriateness of quasi-legislative devel-
opment of police control rules cannot be doubted. Cf Allen, The Judicial Questfor Penal
Justice: The Warren Court and the Criminal Cases, 1975 U. ILL. L.F. 518, 525: ("[The]
failure to devise alternative institutions charged with [responsibility for the integrity of the
criminal justice process] explains in part the willingness of American courts to enter these
areas."); Packer, The Courts, The Police, and the Rest ofUs, 57 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 238, 240
(1966) ("Nobody else is exerting control over the law enforcement process, so the justices [of
the Supreme Court] think that they must.").
158. See Quinn, The Effect of Police Rulemaking on the Scope of Fourth Amendment
Rights, 52 J. URB. L. 25, 39 (1974).
159. "The impact of rulemaking on the patrolman can scarcely be overstated. Operating
under the protective umbrella of department rules, the individual police officer would no
longer be on his own to interpret a given court decision, group of decisions, or statute. His
discretion would be channelled by carefully researched and articulated rules--rules formu-
lated in categories meaningful to a policeman, rather than law textbook groupings not re-
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Finally, agency rulemaking could address police practices that ex-
clusionary system rulemaking cannot. The exclusionary rule is used
only in prosecutions; police abuses or harassment not resulting in pros-
ecution cannot be the subject of rulemaking through exclusion.160
Through hearings, an agency could develop facts about such practices
and devise rules to regulate them.
Aside from apparent questions about the political viability of this
proposal, there may be some immediate objections to the system. Lo-
cal communities and law enforcement agencies would resist creating a
bureaucracy with concentrated power over the police. Furthermore, it
is not clear how an agency would treat a police violation of civil liber-
ties, or. whether it could recommend the exclusion of evidence to a trial
court.
The agency or commission envisioned here would have two kinds
of rulemaking authority. It would be directed by law to codify and
publish advisory codes of police conduct law. In doing so, the agency
would not only codify existing law but also would hold public hearings
on police activities and practices and develop and promulgate new
rules. In addition, to ensure that these rules are followed, the agency
would develop and promulgate codes and procedures for internal po-
lice discipline, training, and for monetary and other remedies for police
violations of civil liberties.
61
Linked to the advisory rulemaking authority would be a certifica-
tion authority.16 2 If a police department adopted the advisory code, or,
after review by the agency, was found to have adopted rules, discipli-
nary procedures, training standards, and remedy schedules functionally
equivalent to or superior to the advisory codes, it would be certified.
Certifications could be revoked on a showing of material and substan-
tial failure to follow the codes. Evidence procured by a certified police
agency would not be subject to the sanction of exclusion. Courts would
continue to use exclusion as a remedy in cases involving uncertified
and decertified police agencies, and in cases involving abusive police
practices violating substantive due process.
This agency rulemaking authority and certification process is
designed to generate policy rulemaking and create incentives for police
lated to situations likely to be encountered on the next tour of duty." Caplan, The Casefor
Rulemaking by Law Enforcement Agencies, 1971 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 500, 502.
160. See Rights of Suspects, supra note 30, at 787.
161. See Kaplan, supra note 63, at 1050-5 1.
162. See id at 1051-54. Proposed California Assembly Constitutional Amendment 31
calls for certification of police agencies. See note 20 supra.
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to follow a generally accepted set of rules. Without a legal requirement
to do so, police agencies are unlikely to draft rules. They have not
done so historically, 63 and many do not have the resources necessary
for comprehensive rulemaking. In addition, although administrative
flexibility must recognize local conditions and the needs of individual
police agencies, rules defining acceptable police conduct should be uni-
form. Finally, this method of police rulemaking would be responsive
to legitimate law enforcement needs and should lead to operationally
framed rules of conduct more useful to officers in the street than court-
devised rules.
Police officers employed by a certified police agency might violate
adopted rules and civil liberties. Although these violations ultimately
could result in loss of certification, the decertification process would
take too long to result in the exclusion of evidence in the immediate
prosecution that depended on the unlawful police practice. In those
cases, except when the court invoked constitutional exclusion power
because there had been a grossly abusive violation of substantive due
process, the defendant's only remedy would be that called for by the
approved code, probably money damages. The agency additionally
might require discipline of the offending officer, but this discipline
would be required to deter future violations by the officer and to pro-
tect or restore certification, not to provide a remedy.
With one exception, this proposed system serves equally well or
better all the constitutional functions of the judicial control system now
served by the exclusionary rule. Some of these functions, such as the
remedial and specific deterrent roles, may be greatly enhanced. The
system provides a forum and a remedy for the innocent injured and,
unlike the exclusion of evidence, also disciplines offending officers.
Institutional adversary challenge of police practices could be pre-
served by allowing strong adversary participation at the rulemaking
stage. Public defender offices and organizations, criminal defense at-
torney associations, and civil rights and minority interest groups are
zealous and highly effective advocates before the legislature. They rep-
resent the police control interests of the public and the accused. They
would likely be equally effective adversary advocates in agency
163. "Historically, law enforcement agencies have been neither bold nor vigorous in the
development of policy. They have responded to the dictates of others, most notably the
judiciary, rather than acting as initiators of policies. As a result, they have not developed in
ways similar to that large and varied host of administrative agencies that routinely issue
policy statements to guide their own employees and the general public." Caplan, The Case
for Rulemaking by Law Enforcement Agencies, 1971 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 500, 501.
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rulemaking. In addition, under this system the exclusionary rule re-
mains a potential sanction for uncertified or decertified police agencies,
and defense interests will have a great incentive to be vigilant in chal-
lenging police practices. Moreover, provisions of attorney's fees for the
successful challenge of a certification, and a fee award for a demon-
strated case of a civil liberties violation, might fulfill any shortfall of
incentive.
Institutional challenge at the rulemaking stage might not have the
sharp quality of trial advocacy that aids the discovery and refinement
of facts, issues, and potential solutions to problems. The quantum of
adversariness necessary to ensure an effective system of administrative
control of police, however, is uncerfain. The exclusionary system ar-
guably permits too much adversariness: many motions to suppress are
filed; many hearings or mini-trials on police conduct are held. More-
over, the fact-sensitive and complex nature of police control law is due
in part to the adversary system. This complexity greatly reduces the
effectiveness of police control law because its rules are neither clear
enough nor simple enough to be readily understood and applied. A
lesser quantum of adversariness might result in less sophisticated but
better defined rules. For this reason, and because there would be
enough advocacy for constitutional purposes under an agency system,
less extensive adversary challenges of police practices should be found
acceptable.
Apart from practical difficulties of instituting a system of adminis-
trative control of the police, therefore, this system is attractive. Theo-
retically, it would serve as well as or better than the exclusionary
system and would lack the defects of that system. There would, how-
ever, be grave difficulties to overcome in order to institute such a
system.
The scope of the regulatory problem of an administrative system
of police regulation is apparent. A rulemaking and certification agency
would have an immense workload, at least initially, and would require
a large staff. Several years would be spent developing manuals of con-
duct through codification of existing law, hearings, rulemaking, and ju-
dicial review. While many police departments might adopt agency
rules, others would not, and the agency would spend a great deal of
time and effort evaluating whether a particular police department's
code satisfied the promulgated standard. It might be more than a dec-
ade, therefore, before the new system would be effectively in place and
the exclusionary rule retired as the major police control device.
Replacing the exclusionary system with an administrative system
May 1982]
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would be difficult, expensive, and time-consuming. This observation
discloses some of the real values of the exclusionary system. It is al-
ready in place and all the system's actors are fully familiar with its
features; it has the efficiency of habit and long refinement. In addition,
much of the work of establishing a code of police behavior has been
accomplished. Although the process remains controversial, the most
difficult issues have already been decided. Were an agency to codify
existing law, many decided issues might be called into question and
relitigated before the agency. Furthermore, the great financial and ad-
ministrative costs of police control are already absorbed by the courts,
law enforcement agencies, and defense interests. To replicate the func-
tions of the existing system would require substantial funding, although
savings, particularly in valuable court time, are also likely.
Finally, as controversial as the exclusionary rule has been, admin-
istrative control of the police also would be controversial. In light of
the interests it would have to regulate and the pressures it would face,
the strength and continued integrity of a fledgling state police commis-
sion are important concerns. To be effective, a state police commission
would have to be both independent and powerful. To be independent,
the commission's mandate and authority must be strong and clear.
Qualifications for membership must be high, and methods and proce-
dures for appointing members should be as apolitical as possible.
Members' terms of office would have to be long, their appointments
staggered, and they should not be subject to removal except for malfea-
sance. Finally, to ensure independence and sufficient power to carry
out its duties, the commission would need adequate and secure
funding.
Merely to state these minimum requirements for ensuring inde-
pendence and power demonstrates the political vulnerability of a state
police commission proposal. With so much at stake, with so many in-
terest groups affecting the legislature, with a public so fearful, it ap-
pears almost impossible to legislate a state administrative agency that
could and would effectively control the police. The silent fate of other
efforts to exert administrative civilian control over the police also sug-
gests that such a proposal would not survive in the legislature, particu-
larly if its true financial and administrative cost were suspected.'
64
Although it would be politically difficult to create an effective state
164. To review the proposed activities and structural and compositional requirements of
a state police commission is to realize that the judiciary already acts as that commission.
The system that cannot, for political reasons, be consciously designed and established has
already evolved-the exclusionary system run by the judiciary. Thus, while the conclusion
1106 THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 33
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police commission, this system could be better than the current exclu-
sionary system. There would be more comprehensive control of the
police than now exists. Civil liberties and police, control rulemaking
would be more rational and more responsive to real issues and legiti-
mate police needs. Society would reap the benefits of the exclusionary
system without its many adverse costs. Energy now devoted to the di-
versionary politics of "courts coddling criminals" would be channeled
into confronting real problems of pervasive crime.
The issue should be placed before the legislature.1 65 Although
courts may have some authority to order police agency rulemaking,
166
they are not equipped to do so on the necessary scale. There is a consti-
tutional alternative to the exclusionary system; the constitutional choice
of an alternative, however, lies not with the courts, but with the legisla-
ture. Continued reliance on the exclusionary rule to realize constitu-
tional commands and values is the fault of the legislature. Political
expedience will perpetuate both relying on and scapegoating the courts.
Constitutional statesmanship and political courage in the legislature
could resolve this impasse.
Conclusion
Powerful political forces are now proposing to end or to alter sig-
nificantly the exclusionary rule. Political opportunism and valid criti-
cisms of the rule have combined to present perhaps the most significant
challenge ever to judicial review of police conduct. While there are
serious social costs attending exclusion of evidence to control the po-
lice, there are also important constitutional benefits. Critics of the ex-
clusionary rule focus primarily on the narrow empirical question
whether exclusion of evidence actually controls specific police conduct.
In so doing, they fail to understand or to acknowledge that the exclu-
sionary system serves several essential constitutional functions apart
from simple deterrence.
A system without an effective means of rulemaking to govern po-
lice behavior is constitutionally impermissible; it can be argued that the
Constitution requires the best system of police control rulemaking and
remains that there is an equally effective constitutional alternative to the exclusionary sys-
tem, it may be an alternative that cannot be effected.
165. The issue is now before the California State legislature. See Cal. Assembly Consti-
tutional Amendment 31, quotedin note 20supra. The language of this proposed amendment
should be changed to accord with federal constitutional requirements and functions, and
authority and funding for the commission should be determined.
166. See K. DAvis, POLICE DIsCRETION (1975); McGowan, Rule-making and the Police,
70 MICH. L. REv. 659 (1974); Wright, BeyondDiscretionary Justice, 81 YALE L.J. 575 (1972).
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rule enforcement devisable. Simply ending the use of exclusion of evi-
dence, without replacing it with a functionally equivalent alternative
means of police control, is constitutionally unacceptable.
Two of the major proposed alternatives to the exclusionary rule
arguably result in a system of police control as good as the present one:
continued exclusion with a good faith exception, -and administrative
control of police. Of these, only administrative control adequately
serves the constitutional functions of the exclusionary system while sat-
isfying the many serious and valid criticisms of the exclusionary rule.
The good faith exception retains all the evils of the exclusionary rule in
theory, but mitigates them by excusing good faith police misconduct
and not excluding the evidence improperly taken. Its use would further
complicate the already complex law and compromise the rulemaking
and control functions of the exclusionary system.
Although administrative regulation would be a better constitu-
tional system of police control, it is politically difficult to achieve be-
cause of the nature of the legislative process. Nevertheless, legislatures
have an obligation to consider and adopt this alternative or to accept
the current exclusionary system. Anything else will compromise the
constitutional obligation to control police forces in accordance with
constitutional limits on their powers.
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